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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation takes up a particular problematic between formal aesthetic content and 
discontent (political and aesthetic). This is done in two ways: directly through examining 
the work of Robin Collyer from 1973-1985 and the writings of Philip Monk, and 
indirectly through my own practice. While Part One is a written thesis, Part Two 
documents elements of my material practice developed over the course of my PhD 
studies: it is the research and working material culminating in the exhibition OUT OF 
ORDER. The period of time that I write about (1973-1985) and the location (Toronto) is 
one where thinking, action and art making appeared to collide with a pronounced 
ontological need—a moment whose paradoxes make it a compelling site for my own 
artistic practice to ground itself. 
Keywords: Robin Collyer; Philip Monk; Philip Fry; Carole Condé and Karl Beveridge; 
Hannah Arendt; sculpture; temporality; out of order; action; thinking and withdrawal.  
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PART ONE  
 
 
PREFACE  
What follows is a foray into select work (‘thought experiments’) produced by artist Robin 
Collyer. His work between 1973 and 1985 is exemplary of a particular problematic 
between formal aesthetic content and discontent (political and aesthetic).  The latter 
functions doubly—discontent as the result of a restless or unsatisfied state; more 
importantly, when content comes apart (disjoint) in “order to be itself as such.”1 
Concurrent with examining the related issues of content, representation and action is the 
devolution of sculpture articulated by the critic Philip Monk, who worked closely with 
Collyer over the period under consideration. Once the objecthood of sculpture has been 
infiltrated by language and photography the original ‘security’ of sculpture is no longer 
available. The resulting spatial and temporal dislocation is not only a consequence of this 
devolution but also the affirmation of sculpture’s promise of spatiality.  Finally, 
overlapping this exploration is the more fundamental premise of the untimely, where 
political theorist Hannah Arendt’s suggestion that thinking is ‘out of order’ is taken as the 
departure point for an examination of the temporal paradoxes of thought and action.  This 
provides a way to reconsider content and discontent alongside withdrawal and 
engagement, and additionally offers a cogent model for the production and reception of 
art.2  
By primarily addressing the years 1973 through 1985, I narrow in on a time of rapid 
change in Toronto—in both art and politics—and the beginning of a radical reassessment 
of artistic and theoretical models and practices. The artists Carole Condé and Karl 
Beveridge contribute to the discussion of the problematic through their turn to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jean Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 3. 
2 The issue of action is a central one for Arendt, as well as representation and content. Arendt is criticized 
for the ‘content problem’ within her own definition of action, and representation is discussed extensively in 
her writings around Watergate and Lying in Politics. It is Monk, however, who provides the theoretical 
definitions of ‘content’ and ‘representation’ that I examine, alongside Arendt’s complex definition of action 
that I use. 
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pragmatic political engagement from a formalist practice.  While they initially followed a 
parallel path to Collyer (both Beveridge and Collyer exhibited at the Carmen Lamanna 
Gallery), their paths were ultimately divergent. At points they will be discussed alongside 
Collyer, and while I will be providing context I will assume the reader has some 
knowledge of the larger practices of Robin Collyer, Philip Monk and Condé and 
Beveridge. This text is not meant to be a survey of the period but rather a particular 
thread where discontent and aesthetic practices merged forcefully and ‘social 
responsibility’ was a repeated refrain. Over time aspects of this debate were eventually 
abandoned and an altogether ‘apolitical’ scene emerged. The ‘lack of history’ in the 
Toronto art community is now a recurring motif. 3  
Recently artist Luis Jacob opened his essay “Communities Between Culture-by-Mouth 
and Culture-by-Media,” with: “Historical continuity is the Achilles heel of Toronto 
artmaking.” More precisely, he continued, “the absence in this city of a sense of historical 
continuity renders the act of making art into a poignant but self self-defeating gesture” 
(Jacob 2009, 87). For Jacob, this wasn’t something to complain about, as he wrote, “I 
honestly cannot imagine working in a different context.” The lack of continuity was due 
in part to a lack of publicness; and in the absence of history people turned to myth, a 
“whispered art history” (Jacob 2009, 87). 
This dissertation is a respectful challenge to the perpetuation of the myth of a lack of 
continuity that Jacob notes, even if the myth is a captivating (albeit well-trodden) one: the 
secrecy and whispered sounds, initiation and anticipation that something is accruing from 
below or from the sides, palpable but ungraspable.  Histories have emerged (more remain 
on the cusp, gossiped about); presupposed continuities continue to be questioned. What is 
needed is an approach that develops a sense of time in discontinuity, a way to counter 
static chronological accounts (perhaps General Idea’s “retrospective futurity”) where 
material is recycled back into narrative to change or contradict: a self-image reimagined. 
The premise of the untimely can be seen as a way to reconsider the questions that follow 
in these pages.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This motif is highly misleading, and one of the most fascinating initial counter-assessments emerged from 
critic Dot Tuer’s examination of the CEAC archive at York University. Chronicled in “The CEAC was 
Banned in Canada,” Tuer’s essay first appeared in C Magazine 11 (1986).  
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The moment I write about is one where thinking, action and art making appear to collide 
with a pronounced ontological need—a moment whose paradoxes make it a compelling 
site for my own artistic practice to ground itself.4 In turn, this study should not be seen as 
a case study or example of an applied philosophy (Hannah Arendt upon Collyer and 
Monk), but of a period in Toronto art in need of reassessment. This is especially so 
considering artist and critic Greg Sholette’s recent claim that “two seemingly opposite 
pedagogical poles appear to be collapsing.” Instead of seeing material or ‘medium’ 
commitment placed opposite ‘social practice art’, I draw attention to a particular time that 
can provide us with a way to see a relation of reciprocal elucidation: where two 
seemingly diametrical opposites—withdrawal and action/content and discontent—can be 
seen as privative and requiring the other.   
Lastly, to place ‘chapters’ in proximity as I would in my sculptural practice (side by side, 
one beneath or between another) is to treat this history and study as ‘objects’ of 
experience and not explication: an altogether different enterprise. What I intend here is to 
set up a relation between explication and proposition. Therefore, the material brought 
together here should not be seen as a collection of documents upholding some historical 
interpretation but envisioned instead, following Sholette, “as an unbounded material 
accumulation capable of becoming a force of spirited intervention in the present.” In this 
regard, Out of Order should be seen as a practice in thinking and sculpture the site.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Artist and writer Greg Sholette has documented important aspects of cultural activism through the past 
thirty years—he was a founding member of the US group Political Art Documentation/Distribution 
(PAD/D: 1980-1988)—and recently offered this assessment in his text OWS: Social Practice Art, 
Abstraction, and the Limits of the Social. “On one side is the singularity of artistic vision expressed as a 
commitment to a particular material or medium. On the other,” he continued, “is an ever-increasing 
pressure on students to work collaboratively through social and participatory formats, often in a public 
context outside the white cube. One of the most common catchall terms for the latter tendency is social 
practice art.” This pedagogical shift to the latter tendency has led to the studio art classroom or seminar 
space becoming a place of contradiction and the “ontological crisis of artistic subjecthood.” 
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1. OUT OF ORDER 
It becomes both boring, and destructive of our continuing interest, to be exclusively 
concerned with action, at the expense of understanding.5   
In 1961 political theorist Hannah Arendt published Between Past and Future, and in the 
preface drew attention to the temporal “intervals” within our daily continuity determined 
by “things that are no longer, and by things that are not yet.” This opening or “gap” 
between past and future is full of potentiality; for Arendt, it was a metaphor for the 
activity of thought itself. It is only when thinking interrupts our ordinary activities—and 
is in turn, interrupted by them—that we can say thinking is “out of order.”  
To think, however, is not to act which “this most solitary occupation can never do, since 
we can only act ‘in concert,’ in company and agreement with our peers…” (LTM, 91). 
Thinking arises from withdrawal, removed from familiar order and requirements. In fact, 
“the need to think can be satisfied only through thinking,” Arendt explained, “and the 
thoughts which I had yesterday will satisfy this need today only to the extent that I can 
think them anew” (TMC, 163). It is worth remembering that for Arendt action is word 
and deed performed in public: it is the political process of coming together, being-with.6 
Action allows for the appearance of the self, speech and its utterance, and as critic Peg 
Birmingham has noted, “The polis finds its proper location anytime and anywhere there 
is the appearance of the unexpected, unpredictable word” (Birmingham 2002, 193).  
The principle question now arises. How to reconcile these two seemingly diametrical 
opposites—withdrawal and action—especially in light of Arendt’s statement that appears 
to suggest that thinking is effectively apolitical? To understand Arendt as not just 
enacting a misplaced classicism with regard to the divide between thinking and acting, 
we need to briefly look at her appropriation of and long-standing engagement with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 From ‘A Tentative Position Paper’ published in The Fox, issue 3, p. 45 (1976). The Fox was a journal 
whose three issues between 1975 and 1976 has had a lasting impact on the intellectual climate of art and its 
institutions. At once historical, political and epistemological, The Fox was the means and embodiment of a 
new social/political art practice by a small coterie of artists affiliated with the Conceptual Art movement 
Art & Language (New York).   
6 In Heidegger’s Being and Time, Mitsein, or being-with, is a constitutive feature of Dasein and being-in-
the-world.  
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thought of Martin Heidegger.7 Heidegger often wrote of the affinities between 
philosophical language and poetry, and offered that poetry—like thought—is nothing like 
action, “which grasps hold directly of the real and alters it.” Language is simultaneously 
the most “dangerous” and giving of possessions, for language inaugurates.8 And here 
poetry and thought are much closer to Arendt’s emphasis on beginnings and action than 
suspected. “Language is not a mere tool, one of the many which man possesses,” 
Heidegger wrote in Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry, “on the contrary, it is only 
language that affords the very possibility of standing in the openness of the existent. Only 
where there is language, is there world, i.e. the perpetually altering circuit of decision and 
production, of action and responsibility, but also of commotion and arbitrariness of decay 
and confusion. Only where world predominates,” he concluded, “is there history” (Brock 
1949, 276). 
This notion of the world and worldliness is a central characteristic found in both 
Heidegger and Arendt’s thought. At times elusive, worldliness has a double function for 
Arendt: the capacity to fabricate and make (the sheer range and world of things), as well 
as “second, subjective in-between” that fuses the first with speech and action.  This 
second characteristic is often intangible yet paradoxically discloses the world, “by 
constituting a shared space of meanings, memories and stories” (Janover 2011, 30). 
While we never leave the world and appearances—there is no outside or beyond as in 
two-world theories—we can withdraw from it. Never can we withdraw altogether, for 
response and responsibility remain.  
This inherent estrangement of thinking has led scholars to Arendt’s late writings and 
unfinished work, particularly her exploration of judgment. Judgment, Arendt wrote, is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The influence of Heidegger’s thought on Hannah Arendt has been sufficiently covered, most thoroughly 
in Dana R. Villa’s The Fate of the Political. There is little need to restate many of the personal facets of 
their relationship here, and I would direct readers to authors such as Peg Birmingham and Jacques 
Taminaux for detailed analysis of philosophical appropriations.  For my purposes here, their relationship 
will be primarily structured through mutual aspects of thinking and issues of temporality.  
8 “It is language,” Heidegger wrote, “which first creates the manifest conditions for menace and confusion 
to existence, and thus the possibility of the loss of existence, that is to say—danger.” Martin Heidegger, 
“Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry,” in Meaning and Existence, edited by Werner Brock (London: 
Routledge, 1949), 275. 
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political faculty par excellence.9 For those in search of an applied political theory, this 
opens up the possibility of reconciliation between thinking and acting. Yet for Arendt, 
thinking—unlike action—produces no results. It does not even endow individuals 
directly with the power to act, and judgment is the “very opposite of the compulsion of 
deduction.”  Judgment is like thinking in that it is not practiced in isolation but requires a 
plurality of participants, which is the condition for a public space. “Judgment of a 
particular phenomenon or event can be the ‘by-product’ of thinking,” Dana Villa writes, 
“not because it is in any sense the direct result of thought, but rather because thinking 
clears the space which makes it possible” (Villa 1999, 101). Understood in this way there 
is little doubt that thought and action turn on one another, and that both are worldly and 
not the diametric opposites a quick reading would insinuate.  
There are still those, however, who charge Arendt with a failure to provide a theory of the 
“temporality of (political) acting” (TNB, 136). Arendt’s notion of thinking, political 
theorist Oliver Marchart explains, “does not take place within the usual time continuum 
but unfolds within the solitude of an ‘eternal now’ that is constantly under pressure by the 
past and the future, by everyday life of politics, by the social and the private” (TNB, 
136). His text Time for a New Beginning speaks to the “messianic conception of political 
temporality” in Arendt and Walter Benjamin, and argues that “to postpone acting to some 
future point means escaping from or avoiding the very temporal mode of politics 
altogether.” He charges Arendt with focusing on the time of thinking and not the time of 
politics. The ‘time’ of politics, he continues, “when it occurs, is—and is always—now” 
(TNB, 147).  He claimed a certain “incoherence” on her part: “on one hand, the gap in 
time associated with the thinking ego and a ‘beginning of a beginning’ is emptied by 
Arendt of any form of acting, while on the other hand, it is only by acting that we can 
effectuate a new beginning…” (TNB, 142). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 It is through Kant’s lectures on aesthetics that Arendt finds a source for her writing on judgment. 
Influenced by Kant’s concept of ‘enlarged mentality,’ Arendt offered that “thinking needs the presence of 
others ‘in whose place’ it must think, whose perspectives it must take into consideration, and without 
whom it never has the opportunity to operate at all” (BPF, 220).  
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The tension Marchart notes between acting and thinking remains unresolved in Arendt. 
Reconciliation is then perhaps the wrong task: to locate (and articulate) the space of 
tension in which to situate a critical art practice is the more demanding one.  
In order to understand the ‘untimely,’ it is necessary to shift attention to the deepening 
ontological significance of temporality that Arendt found in Heidegger. In his text 
Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger famously asked why is there something rather 
than nothing? This questioning “does not stand in the familiar order of the everyday,” 
Heidegger wrote, “so that we could be compelled to it on the ground of some 
requirements or even regulations. Nor does this questioning lie in the sphere of urgent 
concern and the satisfaction of dominant needs.” Instead, he proposed: “the questioning 
itself is out-of-order” (Heidegger 2000, 14).   
This phrase carries with it the importance of temporality that Heidegger explored in 
Being and Time, and in particular the concept of the Augenblick—literally a blink or 
glance of the eye. In his later work, he will refer to the Augenblick as the “event” or a 
“coming to presence.” “For Heidegger,” author Koral Ward writes, “it is a standing out 
from the ordinary temporal dimension in the sense of how temporal modes come to our 
attention” (Ward 2008, 100). The Augenblick is not the disclosure of a particular situation 
but the situatedness itself.  Nothing happens in the Augenblick: there is no ‘content,’ as 
Marchart suggests, yet it is full of possibility. While it may be difficult to locate in place 
or time, to take hold of the Augenblick is to be brought into its promise.10  
Always a careful reader of Heidegger, Arendt wrote in The Life of the Mind, “Thinking 
annihilates temporal as well as spatial distances.  I can anticipate the future, think of it as 
though it were already present, and I can remember the past as though it had not 
disappeared” (LTM, 85). But what does it mean for an artwork (as a thought object) or 
practice to be untimely? Immediately, of course, there is the small fact that for Arendt 
thinking produced no tangible results. “To expect truth to come from thinking,” Arendt 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 “To the anticipation that goes with resolute openness there belongs a presence in accordance with which 
an open decision discloses the situation,” Heidegger explains. “In resolute openness, presence is not only 
brought back from its dispersion into the objects of our most proximate concern, but is held within future 
and having-been. That presence which is held in temporality proper and which is thus itself authentic, we 
call the Augenblick.” (Heidegger 1962, 338: my emphasis).  
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wrote, “signifies that we mistake the need to think with the urge to know.”11 Artworks are 
often tangible: their results often less so. What is the result of an artwork? Is the artwork 
the material manifestation of thinking—an assertion in form? If thinking is a form of 
reflection that does not serve nor act as the ‘handmaiden’ of knowledge, and if 
thinking—with its quest for meaning—is antithetical to knowledge (new or not) then the 
activity of thought must be proffered.   
*** 
With Arendt in mind, the following sections take Robin Collyer’s practice as emblematic 
of thinking through form. His works are to a great extent subtle ‘thought experiments.’ 
The devolution of sculpture his practice takes should not be seen as a simple loss or 
transfer of sculptural integrity to language, photography or ‘politics,’ but rather its 
affirmation. After immediately introducing the two primary consequences of this 
devolution of sculpture I will take a step back and look at the “loosely described semantic 
field” that Collyer’s work developed in the 1970s. This will provide a firm backdrop to 
Collyer’s practice, describing his shift from formal objecthood to referentiality (both self 
and outward).  
In turn, the backdrop will give a fuller understanding of the meaning of this devolution 
and how it took place in the work itself as well as its reception at the time by the attentive 
criticism of Philip Monk and Philip Fry. Additionally, the methodology and anti-
phenomenological position of Monk will become important points to look at.  For the 
critic, art and politics meet in representation, and what space the work allows for the 
viewer is critical.  If sculpture is the medium that most directly confronts our own 
physicality, then Collyer’s works are not simply there to be observed but acted upon.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 It is important to keep in mind Heidegger’s writings on truth as aletheia—a disclosure or 
unconcealment—that is distinct from truth as correspondence.  
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Figure 1 
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2. THE DEVOLUTION OF SCULPTURE UNDER LANGUAGE AND 
PHOTOGRAPHY 
Ectamen neude emin haec movere potest a. The uncertain excerpt sits adjacent to a 
photograph of the artist holding his mother’s hand. A second photo inserted into the first 
depicts the two holding hands and the marriage ring revealed: the “scandal sheet version 
of a myth.” Produced in 1979, Untitled (magazine) (see figures 1, 2) presents ten suites of 
information over 22 sheets of plastic stock. These ‘articles’ or ‘stories’ cover a breadth of 
subject matter, from popular entertainment and news (Regina vs. the Body Politic) to 
communications theory, scandal (Man Marries Mother!) and ‘tragedy.’ Adopting the 
format of a magazine layout, titles illustrations and headlines are placed throughout. The 
artist explores a range of graphic devices used for the transmission of information, often 
accompanied by overlapping sound effects—whoosh, roar, and boom! “The substance of 
the text and captions is printed in Letraset body type,” one critic explained,  “an 
incomprehensible filler used to simulate copy when preparing layouts” (FRY, 61). 
Aligning itself to the motifs and investigations of Conceptual Art, Robin Collyer’s 
Untitled (magazine) is emblematic of the radical semiotic detour his work took in the late 
1970s.  
The sole artwork in a 1979 exhibition, Untitled (magazine) was originally installed in a 
direct line around the gallery walls.12 A note read, “A copy of the magazine from the 
edition printed on paper stock will be available for consultation during the exhibition” 
(FRY, 61).13 For critic Philip Monk, the semiotic concerns of Untitled (magazine) can be 
found in much of Robin Collyer’s artistic practice—both previous and subsequent. 
“Nowhere is sculpture’s devolution under the influence of language and photography 
clearer than in Collyer’s first decade of work,” he wrote.  “In fact, by the late 1970s it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 First exhibited at the Carmen Lamanna Gallery, it has since been shown in different arrangements, most 
often as a grid. A version of the piece was recently installed in Traffic: Conceptual Art in Canada (2010). 
Philip Monk owns a copy of Untitled (magazine), a gift from artist. 
13 In the Spring of 1980 a four-page excerpt was featured in the local art and culture magazine Impulse, 
with numbers at the bottom of Collyer’s pages (37-40) slightly out of sync to the magazines actual pages 
(36-39). Each page had four photographs in a grid, and underneath the four images stood corresponding 
blocks of nine lines of text.  The first line was in English and the rest body type. To a cropped photograph 
of a man’s forehead, Silent speech (thought) to oneself about a debt owed. Beneath an image of hands 
palms up: Alibi, Excuse.  On account of its different function and emphasis I consider this excerpt a wholly 
new piece. 
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might be construed that under the pressures of these semiotic factors Collyer had moved 
entirely away from sculpture” (IOR, 17). Here Monk directly referred to the image-text 
works Untitled (magazine), Privileged Positions (1978) and Something Revolutionary 
(1978).14 Writing in the early 1980s, however, after Collyer’s ‘return’ to sculpture, Monk 
proposed that Collyer’s material language had, in fact, remained consistently sculptural, 
albeit “inflected by this semiotic intervention,” and that it had been representational as 
early as 1973 (IOR, 21).15   
Throughout this period, Monk and Collyer often employed terms in their analysis and 
work both conventional and existential. Titles made references to the ‘I’ and ‘We,’ and in 
Monk’s Language and Representation trilogy the terms become those through which 
content can either return or emerge for the first time after modernism’s progressive “loss 
of content.”16 I would like to term this emergence, however, discontent: when content 
comes apart (disjoint) in “order to be itself as such.” The double meaning—discontent as 
restlessness as well as this splitting in order to provide a space for interpretation and 
meaning—is crucial to my understanding of Collyer’s work. It is the first of two primary 
consequences of the sculptural devolution.  
The second is that when its objecthood has been infiltrated by language and photography 
the original ‘security’ of sculpture is no longer available. As Monk noted, language and 
photography, by the simple fact that they are referential and other than sculpture, 
undermine sculpture’s “self contained existential presence.”17 They point away from it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Also worth considering is that in 1979, Tom Sherman and Collyer would produce a joint ficto-critical 
piece of writing for Impulse magazine titled “ONCE LIVING/In a Healthy State of Paranoia.” Collyer 
would additionally write a defense of influential queer journal Body Politic in Centrefold, while providing 
supplementary photography and the cover image. He would also help produce Centrefold/Fuse for a short 
time. Reference to Body Politic can also be found in his Untitled (magazine).  
15 “Where Collyer succeeds is in the way his sculptures ‘sit’ next to each other, setting up peaceful 
contrasts and relationships. The spacing, he claims, is ultimately based on that of photography.” This is 
critic Merike Weiler writing about Collyer’s work in 1972, yet she comes to a different conclusion than 
Monk: “somehow I can’t escape the nagging doubt that sculpture is really not the ideal medium for Robin 
Collyer’s talents and intentions” (Weiler 1972, 76).  
16 Critics have contested the issue of a ‘loss of content,’ although Monk writes of ‘content’ in such a 
particular manner that it cannot be easily dismissed. As a model it is one I subscribe to. If I initially appear 
to follow too closely to Monk’s criticism it is to the effect of thinking with him, and only after can my own 
critical interpretations emerge.  
17 In Monk’s early writings, Robin Collyer and Ian Carr-Harris are taken as exemplary artists working with 
sculpture and conceptual art after the severe reductions of Minimalism, whereby “the reintroduction of a 
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and refer outward. Interrupting this withdrawal into reference is the body of the viewer 
(the ‘I’).  As a result, there is a temporal and spatial dislocation between a here (site of 
the sculpture) and there (reference), a having been and an unfolding present.  
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
notion of the world beyond the architectonic reductions of ‘primary structures’ allowed an irruption of 
content” (Monk 1988, 11).  
	   13	  
3.  A LOOSELY DESCRIBED SEMANTIC FIELD 
 “Robin Collyer,” curated by Philip Fry in 1982, was a widely traveled retrospective 
exhibition containing objects and installations from the previous thirteen years of 
Collyer’s practice.18 It covered the early ‘formalist’ works, such as Untitled (10) from 
1969 (recreated in 1981), where the artist uses “flexible aluminum tubing to trace out 
contours and circumscribe areas,” to early uses of photography, such as in the 1973 piece 
Shirley and Clint Eastwood (Newfoundland 7/73). It also introduced the more complex 
works made up of diversified units, found in I’m still a Young Man (1973), We can build 
new belief Systems…(1976) and Something old, something new, something scary (1981). 
At this point I would like to examine the emphasis on language and sculptural ‘syntax’ 
that critics Monk and Philip Fry offered at the time of this survey exhibition. It is a 
crucial step in understanding more fully what is meant by the devolution of sculpture, and 
only after can a clear relation between content, representation and action develop.   
A precursor to the exhibition is a lengthy essay Fry wrote in 1980 for Parachute 
magazine called “Robin Collyer: Event, Description, Narrative.”19 Over ten pages, Fry 
worked out an ‘interpretive construction’ of Collyer’s work, recognizing that “to be 
understood, the work requires the exercise of both visual and linguistic aptitudes” (EDN, 
37). As Collyer’s practice shifted in the 1970s to escape the limits of a pictorial 
modernism—a modernism that rejected the literary and narrative—Fry felt it necessary 
for a “corresponding adjustment of the available analytic and descriptive tools” (EDN, 
41).  His essay was an attempt to locate the devices by which the literary and visual are 
related. He carefully noted, however, the risk of treating “the visual as if it were 
structured like language and as if it functioned in a similar way” (EDN, 41).20 Reading 
and viewing are quite particular activities, and Fry advocated the deliberate use of general 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Organized for The Agnes Etherington Art Centre, in Kingston Ontario, the exhibition traveled to 
Saskatoon, Sherbrooke, Halifax and London. 
19 Also in this issue was Philip Monk’s review of the exhibition Pluralities/1980/Pluralites at the National 
Gallery of Canada, where the reader can begin to see the Monk’s questioning of a history of Canadian Art.  
20 Taking up terms like ‘production’, Fry makes a nod to one of Philip Monk’s early texts in a footnote. “As 
I see it,” Fry writes, “’production’ would be similar to Philip Monk’s category of the ‘performative’ in that 
it centers on acts of formulation and reception, that is, the sign-event, but it has, perhaps, a wider extension 
in that it does not necessarily imply the co-presence of the artist (performer) and his public (audience)” 
(EDN, 45).  
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terms—for example ‘production’ and ‘product’—to “avoid obliterating the specific 
distances between the literary and the visual…” (EDN, 41). In closing the essay, Fry 
confessed he raised more issues than he resolved: “A descriptive text stands between the 
reader and the work,” he wrote,  “a mediator re-presenting the absent; using words, its 
very condition is to violate the wholeness of the work, cutting into it, segmenting it, 
naming parts, distinguishing aspects, identifying relationships, rearranging elements—
reconstructing the object according to the dictates of verbal presentation” (EDN, 41).  
 
                                    
Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
 
Figure 5
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Two key intersecting points emerged in Philip Fry’s text.  By describing Collyer’s work 
as a “loosely circumscribed semantic field,” he opened the work—including the early 
‘formal’ works—into the discursive and with it an analysis of the conditions of 
conception, production and reception. Whereas earlier works engaged in a game of 
oppositions between material and support, placement and arrangements, the work of the 
mid to late 1970s introduced systems of representation into the mix.  “His work treats 
perceptible form as a condition of meaning,” Fry wrote, “and goes on to investigate how 
it works in the production of various semantic structures” (FRY, 85). The second 
significant point is an emphasis on disjunction, “a device which indexes the artist’s 
selective and combinatory activity, and at the same time, solicits the viewer to perceive, 
estimate, weigh and judge the relationships between the various elements.” Collyer did 
not leave behind the “insistent literalness” employed in his previous work. With the 
intervention of semiotics an additional and more complicated disjunction would appear. 
Collyer deployed literalness—including the characteristics of text, images and objects—
with the way content is presented.  
If not exactly expanded upon, these points were reiterated in the publication that 
accompanied Collyer’s survey exhibition in 1982. The artist worked closely with Fry, 
having selected and positioned the photographs with the text (see figure 3). Works from 
1969 to 1981 (see figures 4, 5) were included with brief descriptions alongside each, 
followed at the end by a short summary called Back Words.  Curator Bruce Grenville 
noted in a review for Parachute magazine that “an understanding of the exhibition (and 
for those so inclined, a chronological guide to Collyer’s work) is greatly enhanced by a 
reading of Fry’s catalogue” (Grenville 1982, 40). For those unfamiliar with Fry’s 
Parachute text, the catalogue brought his ideas more clearly into focus. In drawing from 
his background in literary criticism, “Fry has succeeded in breaking the restrictive bounds 
of formalist art criticism and opens Collyer’s work up to the environment from which it 
emerges” (Grenville 1982, 40).  
Collyer’s move towards language structuring coincided with the introduction of 
functional objects and commodities into his sculpture.  While the work had an overall 
consistency in its use of distinct units and components, there was a shift in Collyer’s 
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work that Fry dates around 1973 with I’m Still A Young Man.  Philip Monk would echo 
this point, describing it as a shift from formal objecthood to referentiality. Suffice it to 
say, there is a change in orientation from the purely literal concerns of the early 1970s to 
an investigation of reference and evocation.  This led Grenville to further elaborate on 
Collyer’s practice: “It is an art inexorably tied to the media of the urban world; 
photography, film, television, video, magazines, etc, all deal with linguistic and visual 
perception… To deny one or the other,” he charged, “ would be less than satisfactory, if 
not misleading” (Grenville 1982, 40).  
If the dominance of language-based practices in the 1970s tended to deemphasize the 
materiality of the artwork, Robin Collyer worked towards an image-oriented sculpture 
that both questioned and asserted form. His reflexive representational strategies 
acknowledged the social and political function of aesthetic work. This was not only 
reflective of debates around post-structuralism and critical perspectives at the time, but of 
the tone of the Toronto art community.21  “Neither formalism in art,” Monk wrote in a 
review from 1979,  “nor media ever have accommodated themselves to content, although 
they seem to carry the message of content. This situation perhaps developed because 
content demands a public, and both content and public (rather than a spectator or 
audience) are located within the space of politics” (RPA, 49).  
Instead of the “importation of an applied semiotics,” material substrate provided the 
meaning in the work of Collyer.  “As all the works have more than one piece—even the 
photo-works have the supplement of a text—they are thus capable of syntactical 
organization” (NAC, 13). This latter quote is from the first extended essay Philip Monk 
wrote on Collyer. Naming and Comparing closely followed the Agnes Etherington 
exhibition and was—if not the first—the beginning of Monk’s reflections on the artist 
and responses to Philip Fry’s texts.  “In his catalogue essays and entries, “ Monk noted, 
“Fry is engaged in a strategy of description which is interesting in its own right except 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 In the inaugural lecture from the series Talking: A Habit held at the Rivoli in 1982, writer and critic Tim 
Guest noted the re-emergence of the phrase ‘Social Responsibility’ amongst members of the community. 
Guest’s talk was called “The Trouble with Social Realism. ” The series Talking: A Habit were informal 
lectures sponsored by A Space and curated by Christina Ritchie, drawn primarily from Toronto art writers 
in Toronto. The lectures were published afterwards in the magazine Parallelogramme. This series, along 
with A Critical Structur(ing)—a pair of panels organized by Jennifer Ollie and YYZ—inaugurated an 
‘explosion’ of critical discourse in Toronto.  
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that it falls short of analytic overview. The present article simply tries to make up for 
what is left out of that strategy, but which, at times, may be read through the lines of 
Fry’s text” (NAC, 16).  
If Fry opened up the work, Monk has contributed the most detailed and compelling 
analysis of Robin Collyer’s practice. An incomplete list of the various texts written by 
Monk on Collyer would include “Television by Artists,” Canadian Forum (May 1981); 
“Naming and Comparing,” published in Vanguard magazine (February 1983); 
“Integration and Difference” for The Zulu and Other Works for the Canada House 
Cultural Center, London in 1987; and Robin Collyer: Photographs (1999). Additionally, 
Monk has curated Collyer in a series of solo and group exhibitions, including From 
Object to Reference (1983) held at the Carmen Lamanna Gallery; an adapted version 
Object and Reference at the Art Gallery of Ontario (1986); Carambolage, a two person 
exhibition (with Robert Fones) at Baden Baden, Germany (1990); Photographic 
Inscription: Kunst aus Toronto in Stuttgart, Germany (1990) and Robin Collyer: 
Photographs at the Art Gallery of York University (1999). The most thorough exhibition 
and explication of Collyer’s practice remains Idioms of Resistance (1994), a catalogue 
accompanying a solo exhibition at the Art Gallery of Ontario. While ostensibly a survey 
concentrating on the sculpture from 1987 to 1992, the catalogue carried the 
documentation from the earlier retrospective exhibition curated by Philip Fry in 1982. 
When “Naming and Comparing” was published in Vanguard magazine in February 1983, 
Philip Monk had been publishing for close to six years. It would be two years before he 
would accept a position as curator of contemporary Canadian art at the Art Gallery of 
Ontario and put into practice the ‘local history’ for which he argued in many of his early 
essays.  
Before returning to “Naming and Comparing,” it is useful to provide a background to the 
critic. The first of Monk’s critical essays appeared in 1977, the year he graduated from 
the University of Toronto with an MA in Art History. Originally from Winnipeg, Monk 
moved to Ontario after completing a BA in English at the University of Manitoba in 
1972. In a 1977 issue of Parachute magazine he published an essay on the sculptor David 
Rabinowitch and in 1978 wrote a critical assessment of the exhibition Structures for 
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Behavior, an exhibition curated by Roald Nasgaard at the Art Gallery of Ontario.  In the 
latter essay Richard Serra and David Rabinowitch were singled out for critical praise 
while George Trakas and Robert Morris were taken to task “because they exemplified 
precisely those negative characteristics that he critiqued in Nasgaard's curatorial 
assumptions.” Serra and Rabinowitch produced work and situations for viewers whereby 
“a critical awareness of their own productive interaction with each work” could take 
place22 (Clark 1991).  Monk proposed “a definite epistemological break” between Morris 
and Trakas, and the work of Serra and Rabinowitch. “They break on the question of 
subjectivity that either affirms itself as subjectivity or that confirms what can be known to 
be exterior to subjectivity—that is, the material conditions of sculpture and the degree to 
which this posits the world” (SFB, 21). In his text Monk endorsed an anti-
phenomenological position and suggested that both Serra and Rabinovitch’s work were 
tied rather to what he considered to be “a proper critical understanding of the viewer's 
experience of the external world...” (Clark 1991). 
This assessment provides the reader with a clue to Monk’s emerging methodology at the 
time, influenced by the crisis point between imported and limited approaches to 
phenomenology and post-structuralist thought.23 “The works reveal profound discord 
where there was an assumed continuity,” Monk continued. “Conflict arises due to the 
attempt to unite recent trends in sculpture under the dual banner of phenomenology and a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The essay titled “Introduction, Dissemination, and Education” is a survey of “writing on the visual arts in 
English Canada.” It chronicles the funding, writing and transformations of the arts with a special emphasis 
on writers in dialogue with Michel Foucault.  It gives ample information on a variety of writers at the time 
working with Foucault and for my purposes I have selected passages particular to Philip Monk and the 
critique of phenomenology. 
23 The American reception of phenomenology is a complicated affair.  The Anglo-American assimilation of 
French theory often used the terms poststructuralism and deconstruction simultaneously: the latter 
identified with Derrida and de Man and a certain privileged view of language as écriture, while the former 
had a wider swath of reference from Lacan and Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari to Kristeva and Genette 
(who particularly influenced Monk). The exclusive focus on literature of deconstruction, however, is a 
largely North American phenomenon most often associated with the Yale ‘school’. Tilottama Rajan notes 
many of these distinctions in her book Deconstruction and the Remainders of Phenomenology.  
Deconstruction’s ‘institutional impetus’ in France comes from “its attempt to rethink philosophy in the face 
of the rising power of the social sciences” while in the US, deconstruction was seen as a “problematizing of 
or emancipation from structuralism, which retained the latter’s dismissal of phenomenology and its rhetoric 
of the end of man” (Rajan, 4). As Rajan reminds us, to forget the links to phenomenology—deconstruction 
can be seen as the ‘transposition’ of phenomenological into linguistic models while retaining its ontological 
concerns—is to disconnect it from the analytic of finitude and temporality that is at the center of 
deconstruction’s focus on language.  
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‘spatial art,’ each of which is inadequate as either explanation or description for all works 
in the exhibition” (SFB, 21). By spatial art, Monk had in mind ‘post-object art.’ And in 
his habit of splitting, Monk argued that Morris and Trakas exhibited “the subjective, 
romantic and baroque sensibilities” of spatial art (promoted by Morris in his text “The 
Present Tense of Space”), whereas Serra and Rabinowitch the tendencies of judgment 
and understanding: with “understanding judgments in perception by showing, among 
other things, that knowledge is not given a priori or directly in perception and that the 
constructed sculpture, and, by extension, the world, exist, nonetheless, external to our 
perceptions” (DOS, 21).  
‘Phenomenology’ was questionable for Monk and he pursued an enterprise that rejected 
the absolute priority of an observing subject—and with it the notion of a transcendental 
consciousness.24  More specifically, he refused the overlaid influences of positivism and 
phenomenology.25 “Although phenomenology is not a positivism and does not deal with 
‘things in themselves’ but with their appearing, and although American art concerns 
spatial and temporal appearing, both the philosophy and art promote the identity of the 
apodictic” (DOS, 35). Monk further clarified, “Phenomenology is dependent on a 
structure of intentionality which makes apperception in the apodictic;26 American art, 
dependent on this philosophy, repeats it. American art, however, is also heir to a 
positivist tradition that treats the thing in itself, the positivist fact. While these overlaid 
influences of phenomenology and positivism in American art seem contradictory, they 
mutually reinforce the apodictic as identity” (DOS, 35).27 It is the rejection of this 
Husserlian phenomenology that Monk put forth, and he was influenced by the critiques 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 At this point in Monk’s analysis, there was a reduction of phenomenology to Husserl, negating a 
difference between transcendental and existential phenomenology.  Phenomenology as a whole cannot be 
reduced to Husserl or even Heidegger.  
25 Positivism was influential for the development of analytic philosophy, a mainstay of academic American 
philosophy in the 1970s.  
26 The apodictic is that which is necessarily certain: where the given, in principle, could not be otherwise. 
Apperception is the process of understanding something from previous experience, whereby every 
perception is through the apperception of sensations.  
27 On identity and intention, Monk wrote “The identity ‘behind’ the work is the sameness of the intention of 
the artist and the objectivity of the work itself. The identity in ‘front’ of the work is that of the structure of 
the work and the spectator in the spectator’s experience of the work—an intentional experience in the 
phenomenological sense on the part of the spectator. Basically, this is a symbolic relationship as explained 
by hermeneutics; and an enactment of repetition and representation on the part of the spectator” (DOS, 35).  
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argued from Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida.28 This can be gleaned from Monk’s 
footnotes, which make mention of both Derrida’s Speech and Phenomena (1973) and 
Marvin Farber’s The Foundations of Phenomenology (1966). Derrida’s Speech and 
Phenomena is a sustained critique of Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Husserl was one 
of the powerful ‘logicians,’ and Derrida attacked the notion that language is based on 
logic, rather than rhetoric—finding the structure of Logical Investigations a repetition of 
the axioms of traditional metaphysics.  
Following this text was an impressive and prolific display of Monk’s analyses in 1979. 
To look briefly at a select few will assist in broadening an understanding of his positions, 
terms (‘content’ and ‘representation’) and approach to Collyer’s sculpture. Three separate 
writings from Monk are found in one issue of Parachute magazine (issue 16). “The 
Death of Structure” is one such text where, as shown above, we can glean his 
philosophical inquiries.  Ostensibly an essay responding to an earlier catalogue essay of 
his own (published in the fall of 1978), “The Death of Structure” hones in on the 
tendencies of self described ‘serial reductivists,’ painters like M.W. Jewell. The second is 
a review of a 15-year retrospective of painter Yves Gaucher and the last a review of an 
exhibition at the Carmen Lamanna Gallery by Carole Condé and Karl Beveridge called 
“Reading and Representation in Political Art.”  
 A leading figure of Quebec’s post WWII art scene, Yves Gaucher presented a survey of 
work at the Art Gallery of Ontario in 1978. “The phenomenological justification of these 
works,” Monk wrote, “(and others)—their supposed turn to the body’s spatiality, but a 
spatiality effaced within temporality, I would say—is only possible within the symbolic 
and ideal space of the art gallery.” The sentence revealed an examination of context and 
can be seen in affinity with the emerging project of institutional critique.29 “This 
promotion of the experience of temporality,” he continued, “is only the most recent of 
abstractions created from the meditative space and supportive ideology of the art gallery; 
while outside this space, we are condemned to the political technology of our bodies, to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Yet	  by drawing on a caricature of Husserlian phenomenology, Monk covered over the complexities of 
phenomenology, as well as Derrida and Foucault’s indebtedness to the tradition from which they emerged. 	  29	  Brian O’Doherty’s influential series of essays “Inside the White Cube: The Ideology of the Gallery 
Space” first appeared in Artforum in 1976. 	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inscribing spatiality.” If phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty stressed an embodied 
consciousness that engaged the world, it was also necessary to note that the lived body 
was organized within the conditions of his or her environment: that it was dependent on 
cultural repertoires.  
“Phenomenology,” Monk continued, “and works based on that philosophy of perception 
and being, cannot ensure the ‘truth’ of our bodies. It remains to us to find how that ‘truth’ 
is/was created” (Monk 1979, 48). What exactly Monk means by “truth” remains elusive, 
but his interpretation of Gaucher’s paintings is blunt and displays alarm at the rhetoric of 
experience, perception and subjectivity that often accompanied reductive or “minimalist” 
artworks. In a damning conclusion he wrote, “Self constitution through the perceptual-
consciousness system and the intersubjectivity of phenomenology are insufficient 
justification for a body of work” (Monk 1979, 48: my emphasis). While to infer that 
certain ideas, processes or forms are “insufficient justification” for a body of work seems 
to narrow the criteria for what a radical artistic practice could be, Monk stakes his 
argument on that which undergirds experience.  
The review of Carole Condé and Karl Beveridge’s Maybe Wendy’s Right provided less a 
philosophical inquiry than an explicitly political one.30 One of Condé and Beveridge’s 
early collaborative attempts at political engagement through the use of photo-narrative, 
the exhibition explored issues of labor, family, class and representation. “In raising the 
question of a political art of content,” Monk wrote, “we perhaps should ask whether there 
is a distinction between political art and political content.” Content becomes a significant 
issue for the critic, an issue that would be a continual investigation. Content must 
confront representation, rather than its absorption within representation. “Content, as I 
wish to use it,” Monk defined, “is not an intention, a representation, or a reading. It is not 
substantive, but a process that is productive in relation to a public—and that relation is 
one of desire” (RPA, 50). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 In examining the relationship between politics, content and form, this overlooked piece of writing is 
central to my study. Each of these early texts by Monk can be seen as a search for a new vocabulary of 
criticism to accompany newly critical artworks emerging in Toronto. Instead of ‘importing’ history and 
theory from elsewhere Monk sought a more local criticism, and this was a political demand.  
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If reading and representation are inseparable in the work of Condé and Beveridge 
(reading clues and signs), then “to be effective,” Monk wrote, in a cast of his own project, 
“a reading must be a productive transformation of the text—within one’s body, within the 
social.” He saw a failure on the artists’ (Condé and Beveridge) part to make a connection 
with the public: the signs pointed to one meaning, only one reading or representation. 
There were no ambiguity or breaks—no disruption that signified contradiction—and little 
did it matter what one’s politics were because there was still only one meaning. There 
was no misinterpreting the politics of this work: “In this, Condé and Beveridge show 
themselves to be traditional leftists who wish to represent (in the dual sense in art and 
politics of the represented and the representative) the desires of the masses” (RPA, 50). 
Through these short reviews the sense of the importance of process, content (political) 
and representation came to light. In order to draw further on the importance of “Reading 
and Representation in Political Art,” however, we need to return to Collyer’s sculpture 
with this broader understanding of Philip Monk’s methodology at hand. Referentiality—
both self and reflective of an outward social space—as manifest in artworks (sculpture) 
will need to be examined more before fusing the discussion with political representation 
and the question of action.  
 
4. NAMING AND COMPARING 
As previously noted, both Philip Fry and Monk argued a central place for Robin 
Collyer’s 1973 sculpture I’m still a Young Man as the beginning of a shift from formal 
objecthood to referentiality. Whereas Collyer exploited the gaps that separate the discrete 
units in the earlier works—where “linear, planar and hollow components open ends or 
sides delineate the spatial structure of the installation,” in the works from the mid to late 
1970s he turned his attention to an examination of the conditions of the subject or viewer, 
the image-consumer (FRY, 84). If placement alone determined whether objects belonged 
together, now it was something altogether more. This fourth section discusses the 
introduction of namable objects to Collyer’s ensembles and syntax, the resultant change 
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in status of those objects and further articulation of this shift to referentiality both self and 
outward. 
    
Figure 6 
“We still see various materials and forms,” Monk wrote of I’m still a Young Man, “but 
instead of a collection of qualities composing formal relations, we find objects in front of 
us” (NAC, 14). The result is a change in their status from phenomenal to ontological: no 
longer “merely perceivable qualities” of line and form but namable objects forming an 
aesthetic whole and belonging to a semantic field31 (see figure 6).  A description is 
helpful in understanding the work more fully. I’m still a Young Man has three discrete 
components: a “model airplane” on a metal support, a child’s “tent” and a Masonite 
construction or “sculpture.”32 Each unit is free standing, with the airplane to the left of 
the tent and the Masonite form to the right. The glider model has a wingspan of 
approximately six feet. It is constructed from balsa wood and tissue paper, existing “not 
only as an object but also [evoking] a world of youthful activities, attitudes and values” 
(FRY, 30). It sits on a dark shaped box floorbound, perhaps a plinth or support. However, 
“the tent-like object refers to a tent more than it is one: its cotton fabric and completely 
sealed seams show it to be a facsimile” (NAC, 14).  It has a clearly delineated shape yet 
no floor, ungrounded. The third and last unit is made from Masonite scraps affixed to a 
wooden armature. It is a volumetric construction, a  “self-referential quotation of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ontology is the study of systems of being: a concern about what kinds of things exist. In this case the 
shift from the phenomenal to ontological refers to the emerging relations and system of meaning within 
Collyer’s work.  
32 Curiously, the two ‘sculptures’ in the images in Figure 6 are different shades, one much lighter than the 
other. Collyer speculates this is simply the result of Masonite aging and darkening over the years.  
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‘sculpture’ within the whole sculpture.”  However, “for these inclusions to make 
sense…” Monk proposed, “they must be linked in a coherent framework whose meaning 
displaces the effects associated with formalism’s aesthetic qualities” (IOR, 17). The 
framework for meaning is that of language, of phrasing sculpture.  
Although published in Vanguard in February 1983 as “Meaning and Comparing,” the 
essay was mistitled. It ought to have been “Naming and Comparing.” Monk wrote a letter 
to the editor clarifying the issue: “naming is more appropriate to the work of Collyer and 
to my intent than ‘meaning.’” The structure of Collyer’s work as analogous to language 
and the function of naming and syntactic organization are but a few of the main points of 
his analysis. “Whereas in Likers (i.e., comparative), Lance Allworth [1971] is a proper 
name. It does not describe, but gives the ensemble a name as an object. Henceforth, it 
stands for or designates its reference” (NAC, 14). Notably different, with I’m Still a 
Young Man (1973), the title is a declarative sentence with a subject and a predicate. The 
use of “I” is central. “It is,” Monk wrote, “what is called a shifter, and has its proper 
reference each time that it is used in speech” (NAC, 15). It changes its meaning 
according to the person speaking or being spoken to. In Fry’s analysis, the ‘I’ is many: 
the artist, the camper and the model plane builder: “To this controlled duplication of the 
‘I’ who asserts, corresponds the possibility of duplicity, of the lie. And then, for us, the 
question is not only of seeing, but of believing” (Fry, 31-32, see figure 7).33  
The three namable elements in I’m Still a Young Man are bound to the title; each is a part 
of a ‘sentence’ composed in relation to the title and reference. “The objects are wholes as 
much as parts,” Monk noted, and as a result the reference is doubled (NAC, 14). The 
objects have autobiographical (real or imaginary) resonance and are of individual value; 
we can infer that it is the artist who is ‘speaking.’ As previously cited, the “coming to 
speech of the viewer” is central to Monk’s own critical project. This will be explored 
further in the next section but in short, the viewer is a ‘convention;’ what returns after the 
assault on artistic conventions and modernist transparency is “a new position for the 
viewer—the position as operator or performer” (SWI, 63-64).  Returning to I’m Still a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 In Fry’s catalogue, I’m Still a Young Man is inscribed with a small photograph of the artist standing with 
his hands by his side. Quotation marks are at each ear signifying ‘artist’ or alternately, ‘Robin Collyer.’  
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Young Man, Monk wrote, “By the analogy of the artist using an ‘I’ in the title, the proper 
reference for the viewer would be a positive coming to speech by assuming the ‘I’ in 
viewing. This would mean a translation of the copyrightable ‘I’ of a unique reference to 
the artist into the speech of the viewer” (NAC, 15).34  
Like I’m Still a Young Man, the 1976 ensemble We can build new belief Systems is 
composed of multiple parts both real and functional (see figure 8). There is an electric 
fan, a metal ornamental windmill “and an aluminum cross constructed by the artist that 
rotates on the wall by means of an electric motor.” They are synchronized in rotation—a 
movement that goes nowhere (or alternately, all directions at once).35 A text panel is also 
placed on the wall. Positioned similar to that of a caption or label, it displays a quotation 
from US astronaut Ed Mitchell: “We can build new belief systems augmented and 
bolstered by scientific investigation” (FRY, 50). The objects in We can build new belief 
Systems are symbols of social value, indicated by the first person plural pronoun ‘we’ 
(the agents of change) and the multiple ‘belief systems.’ While it appears that there is a 
singular cause to the turning of the cross (the fan) there are actually two (the fan and 
electric motor), and this circular repetition is in disjunction to Mitchell’s solicitation: 
scientific rationality is a belief system as much as religion.36   
“Despite the way it is usually classified,” Fry noted in his catalogue, “‘we’ is not simply 
the plural form of ‘I’; it stands for a relatively complex interpersonal structure in which 
the speaker, assuming or having obtained the complicity of other people, associates them 
with his or her proposition” (FRY, 52). By introducing entities into discourse, the ‘I’ and 
‘You’ assign dialogic roles that produce the speaker and addressee. ‘We’ is the ‘I’ 
speaking for a singular or plural ‘You,’ and in Collyer’s text the astronaut Mitchell has 
the role of speaker—but only on account of the artist recognizing him as such. “The act 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See Monk’s Colony, Commodity and Copyright. “Copyright supports, the index confirms identity and 
presence.” (SWI, 94) 
35 See Jean-Luc Nancy: “From place to place, and from moment to moment, without any progression or 
linear path, bit by bit and case by case, essentially accidental, it is singular and plural in its very principle” 
(Nancy 2000, 5).  
36 This theme is recurrent. From 1986: “As Jeanne Randolph has shown (see Parachute No. 41), it is 
possible to build an understanding of Collyer’s The Zulu (through this interplay between the object and 
reference) which ultimately invites us to ask the question: ‘What are the conditions under which the subject 
is formed within the technological ethos?’” Bruce Grenville, Parachute No. 44: 34.  
	   27	  
of quoting does not, in itself, mean that the artist is in agreement or disagreement with 
what is said” Fry elaborated. “The use of the ‘we,’ however, at least makes it SEEM that 
both parties are of the same opinion.” This appearance of union is questioned by that 
artist in his use of the circular movements at the core of the sculpture. In this case, the 
object in the gallery—We can build new belief Systems—partakes in the turning of an 
individual into a subject.  
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Figure 7 
	   29	  
 
Figure 8 
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5.  I AND WE, SUBJECTS OF 
At this point we turn to these shifting terms the ‘I’ and ‘We’ in order to clarify an 
understanding of the role of conventions and the viewer in Collyer’s work, and develop 
further analysis of the subject that is not the singular but one with or singular plural.37 
Philip Monk’s “Coming to Speech: The Role of the Viewer in Performance” (1980) 
provides more information on his approach to performativity. It was first presented as a 
lecture in Montreal at the colloquium “Multidisciplinary Aspects of Performance: 
Postmodernism.” “Performance,” Philip Monk wrote, “together with that broader 
manifestation called ‘Postmodernism’ have ensured the revival of a number of 
conventions suppressed in Modernism: genre, allegory, narrative, mimesis.” By calling 
into question languages and codes within the gallery, codes multiply.38 “Even in its 
multiplications, performance potentially establishes itself as a conventional act, and act 
which may be constructed” (SWI, 63). The viewer returns not as a unified subject but as a 
voice among the codes: as a “drift” alongside structures and within conventions.  “My 
concern,” Monk revealed, “is the degree of identity or drift the viewer is allowed” (SWI, 
64).39  
The notion of the performative, or speech acts—where an utterance “transforms a 
situation and produces an effect”— is his departure point.  It is put forward alongside the 
question: What spaces for interpretation does the work allow? In the essay, Monk 
sketched three spaces for the viewer or audience: the space of spectating (a  “locale of 
idealist or phenomenological identity”), that of reading/semiotics, and the more 
problematic space of performance. “Just as performance makes demands on the viewer, 
so the performative utterance needs an addressee to be successful. The viewer is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 As already noted, shifters are have referents differentiated by speaker and situation. “Who the pronoun 
‘I’ refers to depends on who takes up the active speech role at a given point in time. Its reference is 
therefore fixed in performative rather than truth-conditional terms” (Stawarska 2009, 61).  To delve into 
the larger issues of the confinement of classical phenomenology to an egocentric perspective is a task that 
is untenable here; what should be noted is that it is this transcendental tradition that Monk argued against, 
as well as a field of inquiry “in the exclusively first-person consciousness construed as the site of 
indubitable knowledge” (Stawarska 2009, 5).  
38 There are certain conventions that remained unbroken by 1979, including the objecthood of the work of 
art and its status as a product or commodity and the gallery exhibition format (white cube).  
39  This notion of the ‘drift’ was taken up recently in his pamphlet Peripheral Drift: A Vocabulary of 
Theoretical Criticism (1979).	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conventionally demanded”40 (SWI, 66). Like a promise, there is a conventional code: 
appropriate circumstances and participants are needed. Of central concern is to be heard 
and understood as promising by an addressee.  
Monk noted that the performative model offered five useful qualities for his argument. 
While the performative is conventional it allows for an effect; an audience is necessary 
and affirmed—their understanding is essential to the act; this understanding is effective 
and something is transformed; “the relation between performer and audience is not on the 
order of an intention, but a promise (the performative is founded on the study of the 
promise whereas semiotics is founded on the possibility of the lie)” (SWI, 67), and there 
is a suggested and/or real transfer of responsibility to the audience. The result is that the 
viewer is ‘performative.’  
Monk continued, “If the viewer comes to speech—which is not the same as 
participation—by becoming performative in interpretation, then he or she is no longer in 
a position of transparent identification with the work, nor secondary to it as, for example, 
a critical commentary is presumed to be. The viewer is not only necessary, but affirmed, 
in performance” (SWI, 67; my emphasis). What Monk is emphasizing by his focus on the 
I and the We or subjects of, is the affirmation of potential. That potential is tied to the 
space for interpretation the work allows, and the value of infelicity: an interruption that 
renders something out of order.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Philip Monk wrote in Coming to Speech, “Performative utterances can ‘create or define new forms of 
behavior’ within the conventional” (SWI, 65).  
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6.  REFUSAL OF PERFORMATIVITY 
A text of six lines accompanies six photographs. The images are upside down shots of a 
ceiling—possibly an old commercial or industrial loft—suggesting it was a floor.  Placed 
in a left to right series, the photographs are pinned directly to the wall.  “Designed to 
hang downwards, light fixtures with metal reflector discs and naked bulbs seem to stand 
upright on rigid stems, strangely contradicting the dictates of gravity” (EDN, 39). Each 
image has slight changes in orientation. The first three photographs present a 
multifaceted view of a static setting, whereas in the fourth a reel of film appears left of 
center, unwound, as if thrown into the air. The reel spins across the images until, when in 
the last, “light glints off the metallic reel, forming a gleaming cross of prismatic colors” 
(EDN, 39).41 
I am unimpressed by recent movements 
I need a new direction 
Something to believe in 
To have faith in 
An activity to turn to 
Something revolutionary. 
Something Revolutionary was prepared first for presentation in a catalogue for an 
exhibition at the Kunsthalle, Basel in 1978.42 Instead of being grasped as a linear 
totality—with the beginning and end presented simultaneously—the book format 
unfolded as a sequence, temporal and rhythmic. Near the upper center of each page was 
printed a black and white photograph. At each corner of the photograph were drawn 
movement arrows suggesting counter-clockwise rotation, “notations which could be 
understood as indicating the picture turning on the page or the camera turning in regard to 
the view.” Beneath each photograph was printed a line of text in English and underneath 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The reel of film is only in the wall incarnation, as is a visible clothesline curved upwards.  
42 As far as my research shows, Philip Fry is the only author to have written of these two versions, and my 
descriptions are primarily borrowed from his Robin Collyer: Event, Description, Narrative. 
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its equivalent in computer code: the simultaneous presentation of two languages. “At the 
bottom of the page, a hand drawn cross forming four quadrants and curved directional 
arrows were used singly or in combination to suggest static position or more or less 
vigorous clockwise rotation” (EDN, 39). Key information was hidden as one turned from 
page to page and the work could not be grasped as a whole, subsequently parsed and 
distinguished.43  
When displayed on the wall, the photographs were reshot in color and printed on 
individual sheets of photographic paper with an asymmetrical white margin.  All but the 
first and last were printed askew on the paper, “giving their edges a slightly different 
orientation or slant than that of their material supports” (EDN, 39). Pins attached the 
pictures “as flat physical things” directly to the wall. “The interplay between the skew of 
the images and the tilt of the paper supports in their linear arrangement, are only 
approximate functional equivalents to the devices [drawings and notations] used in the 
catalogue version to cloud transparency, to check the transitivity of the pictures” (EDN, 
40). The six lines of text are placed in their entirety near the first photograph of the 
sequence, providing a semantic framework. Yet the positional orientation is ambiguous, 
and the text is judgmental and affective. “Action remains suspended, in the air,” Philip 
Monk noted. And then: “We cannot stand to this upside-down space nor act on these 
statements—make them performative” (SWI, 102).  
 What is it about these statements that prevent them from becoming performative?44 Is it 
something in the work itself that refuses? In Fry’s initial description, “The first person 
singular, ‘I,’ identifying the source of the text as subjectively involved in the 
declaration’s formulations, confirms what is demonstrated by the photographs concerning 
the artists’ position as an actor, and at the same time, solicits the viewer’s participation as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The Swiss critic Hans Jürg Kupper reviewed the Kunsthalle Basel exhibition for the Basler Zeitung (June 
12, 1978).  Afterwards it was translated and reprinted in the June/July 1979 issue of Vanguard. The 
exhibition itself was curated by Christophe Ammann after having visited Canada the previous year. “All of 
these artists reveal the secrets of what is ostensibly commonplace,” Kupper wrote. “Their task is to depict 
the process of fragmentary recognition of their situations, and in the most extreme cases it comes across as 
almost incommunicable introspection and socio-political impulse.” Kupper felt Collyer less critical than 
General Idea, but more lyrical. “Collyer, Fischl and Tangredi, all know how to tell us about voices that we 
can’t hear.”  
44 Monk has written comparatively little about this piece. 
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‘you,’ the person being spoken to” (FRY, 41). In contrast to I am Still a Young Man, 
Monk argued that this work uses the ‘I’ less ‘positively.’45 “The narrowing of semantic 
reference by the purely physical ‘interpretation’ or illustration given by the photographs 
reinforces the impasse between content and expression of action. The sequence does not 
necessarily describe an event; it is a fictional construction” (SWI, 103). 
We should keep in mind that ‘performative’ is not to be reduced to forms of staging or 
theatricality, and what Monk had in mind is more than simple ‘participation’ on the 
viewer’s part.  Let us return to the essay “Coming to Speech: The Role of the Viewer in 
Performance.” “Once again,” he wrote, “it is a question of identity of drift for the viewer: 
what identification(s) does the work make; what movements does it compel?” (SWI, 68).  
He was using the term introduced by John L. Austin and further developed by Derrida.  
What Monk appeared to be arguing for was a non-autonomous and non-subjectivist idea 
of action: a definition that also has some similarities to that offered by Hannah Arendt, 
who opened this text and to whom I will return below. Operative in conventions, the 
performative can allow for an effect that reaches beyond the realm of language. Language 
and signs often produce the reality they describe (naming and inaugurating, 
representing). What should be stressed is not only listening to what one says, but also 
what the individual is doing by speaking. As others (viewers) attempt to make sense of 
what is being done, meaning is brought forth, for there is no meaning if meaning is not 
shared.  
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 “The possibility of failure is internal to the performative and a point of departure for investigating it,” 
Jonathan Culler notes. “Something cannot be performative unless it can go wrong” (Culler 1982, 114). The 
positive or happy performative is a smooth functioning of a performative: it satisfies the conventional 
conditions for it to succeed and is properly practiced by the participants.  
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7. LANGUAGE AND REPRESENTATION 
In order to bring the issues of performativity just outlined in relation to representation and 
action it is necessary to turn to Philip Monk’s thesis titled Language and Representation. 
The trio of exhibitions included Language and Representation (1981-1982), From Object 
to Reference (1972-1981) in June 1983, and Subjects in Pictures (1984). Each was an 
important event in curatorial strategy and art criticism in Toronto. While the series is due 
for detailed revisiting, I will only note aspects of it that keep with the central focus of this 
thesis.  “Art and politics meet in the word ‘representation,’” Monk wrote, “and every 
artistic production contains a representation of the viewer on the model of political 
representation” (LAR, 6). 
The first incarnation of the series was an installation at A Space Gallery and the Funnel 
Experimental Film Theatre from November 19, 1981 to February 24, 1982. “The aim of 
Language and Representation,” Philip Monk revealed to critic Gary Michael Dault in the 
winter of 1984, “was to work out a model of representation that was adequate to the 
process of making art. I wanted to give position and value to what I felt was a largely 
discredited or at least much misunderstood term” (Dault 1984, 70).  Representation was 
held as an antidote to the history of modernism, which he considered a “history of the 
progressive loss of content.” To reclaim representation involved neither an embrace of 
imitative image making nor the New Image painting widespread at the time. 
Representation offered itself “as a sort of centrifugal escape from what [Monk] had come 
to regard as the life-negating vortex of modernist artifice” (Dault 1984, 70). To hear 
Dault tell it, “Representation, fully understood was the way out of modernism’s imposed 
constructs. In addition, where modernist art was closed and bounded, representation was, 
by contrast, a true discourse, an argument, a stance-taking, a naming, an investigation of 
value—in the societal, not the materialist sense” (Dault 1984, 70).  Representation was 
standing for, in a doubled sense:  it simultaneously stood for something to somebody and 
took a position in doing so.  
The exhibition Language and Representation was actually a series of three separate 
shows and video screenings that included five artists and one collective: Brian Boigon, 
Andy Patton, Kim Tomczak, John Scott, Judith Doyle and Missing Associates. “As the 
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title came before,” Monk explained in the catalogue essay, “the works seemed called to 
demonstrate its conjecture; but the works produced did not have to illustrate the ‘theme’ 
of the title.”46 At thirty-two pages, the catalogue is fairly straightforward. It includes an 
opening essay, followed by page-long texts for each artist; the former is included in the 
collection of Monk’s writings published in 1988 called Struggles with the Image, while 
the latter remain entrenched within the catalogue pages.  The images are reproduced in 
black and white and the cover is printed in color; fittingly, it includes an illustration from 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics. “It is the representational 
character of this work,” Monk wrote, “whether language or image alone, or image 
subtended by language, that is the question here—representation is not under question” 
(LAR, 3).  In accompanying the excluded viewer towards speech, the referent must come 
into view. And since the artwork “stands between this viewer and the referent, and 
mediates them, its reference cannot be the issue of a generalized representation. Its 
position is one of proximity, which lends the work a local political dimension, and 
suggests the dedication of this project to the place from which we speak” (LAR, 3).   
As the ideological means by which social constructions were declared a natural order, 
representation had undergone a severe critical analysis in the 1970s. Monk noted that its 
value had risen or fallen in company with the term ‘bourgeois,’ and this led to the 
peculiar caveat that the term often only be used with the use of inverted commas.  Its 
effects were felt in the following ways: representation was excluded from a Modernist art 
project that favored the “immediate, concrete and irreducible,” where “what was unique 
and proper to the medium asserted itself in all its positivity” (LAR, 4).  This self-criticism 
sustained the project and the “form of critique” repeated itself. Monk declared that this 
repetition was now its history. Phenomenology, “in its concern for the contents of 
experience, repeated the empty form of a presumed presence.”  And while critical and 
semiotic theory took representation as the term of their analysis, they have “had to 
exclude the referent as a disturbance to the purity of the theoretical model” (LAR, 4). The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 In Tim Guest’s review of the multipart exhibition only three installations are written of: Brian Boigon’s 
elaborately constructed entrance and architectural renovation of A Space called Border Crossings, Andy 
Patton’s Advertising Transparencies and Kim Tomczak’s The spoils of War. The others were omitted.  
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referent and representation were thus condemned, leading Monk to conclude that it was a 
theoretical impossibility to “speak positively” of representation.  
This limit is, of course, precisely the point where Monk staked his argument, proposing 
an affirmative revaluation of representation and its conventions, one that would “take us 
beyond the reductive exclusions of formalism and the critique-bound orthodoxies of 
ideological analysis” (LAR, 5). He advocated representation as language and as what is 
representable by language.  Representation is not simply a series of descriptive 
statements with attributable truth-values, but a type of naming brought about in relation 
to something—in this case, with images. In doing so the image is inflected by a text or 
voice, a referent setting up another sense of representation. Naming is giving the content 
a concrete dimension: it inaugurates. “While structural conditions of representability 
ensue when something stands for another,” Monk wrote, “the relation of representation to 
its ‘object’ (the something) and ‘user’ (the somebody) introduces the semantic and 
pragmatic dimensions respectively of the work. These relations take it outside a formal, 
self-referring system. A work is referential and representative as well as representational” 
(LAR, 6). In this regard the formal investigations of representation are secondary to what 
is represented: “The investigation is not primarily a structural concern, which in the end 
presents an empty formal model.” While the art Monk advocated concerned itself with 
representation’s structural conditions, it did so without forgetting the referent. In fact, “an 
erased referent resurfaces,” he wrote, “and content returns as a semantics of history” 
(LAR, 6). 
Art and action meet in representation. This is echoed in Monk’s call for a double sense of 
representation’s “standing for.” “To call for something to take a place, for someone to 
represent positions and values, to call a halt to the infinite production of capitalist flows, 
is to call for work at its word” (LAR, 7). As shown, Robin Collyer’s sculptural practice 
also dealt with the language and image—with issues of representation. In discussing three 
sculptures from the early 1980s in the next section, we can see how abstraction interacts 
with representation. How and where abstraction and the ‘non-representational’ intersect 
with the social is also a question worth consideration and discussed in the final sections 
of this paper. Collyer’s works shift from formal self-referentiality to reference outside of 
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themselves; in addition, the viewer becomes a disturbance to the sculpture’s presence. It 
is this disturbance to which we now turn.  
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8.  THREE SCULPTURES 
 
                     
Figure 9 
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1981 saw the production of a series of challenging works by Robin Collyer. These works 
are part of his ‘return’ to sculpture after the text and image works of the late 1970s and 
embody most explicitly the transition and devolution of his sculpture under language (see 
figure 9). The three sculptures that will be discussed are Industrial/mine/Theirs, 
Something old, something new, something scary, and Buy Me (all 1981). They address 
issues of representation and proceed without ‘solutions’ as to how to act upon the work. 
Each sculpture is divided in presentation, utilizing both wall and floor. In splitting the 
space between a ‘here’ and a reference, Monk had noted, the sculpture’s presence is 
undermined as is the viewer’s own: the result is a spatializing and temporalizing “that 
could only be considered as sculptural” (SWI, 128). While I have already referred to 
Monk’s provocative claim earlier in this paper (and left it as a statement) now is the 
opportune time to examine it more fully alongside these three works.   
Industrial/mine/Theirs is an ensemble consisting of five units (see figure 10). As stated 
earlier by Monk, by 1981 “it became clear that Collyer’s sculptures were articulated on a 
part-to-part basis in relation not just to objects but to systems of representation outside 
them…” (IOR, 21). Even with five elements Industrial/mine/Theirs is based on a 
tripartite construction, and in this regard it is similar to I’m Still a Young Man. The title, 
however, gives less biographical information and the placement of the components on the 
wall give the work the appearance of a more didactic presentation. “The frontal approach, 
however,” Monk wrote, “constrains our reading, making us pass from left to right to left 
across the floor and, where there is a correspondence, from floor to wall. Thus, we have 
two distinct axes, one horizontal, the other vertical, that seem to determine our reading” 
(IOR, 21). All of the components are approximately the same size—“a standardization of 
scale, which imposes a kind of common denominator upon the units” and (excluding the 
‘painting’) the same mute tonal range (FRY, 71). This suggests equivalence, especially 
laid out, as they resemble a grid format. “The title, with its play on the word ‘mine,’ 
focuses on the roles played by the producers and the consumers of homogenized 
industrial objects” (FRY, 72). 
The floor units are three: a plastic model that suggests a refinery or industrial plant, with 
its cylindrical towers and storage tanks, as well as an open frame reminiscent of a chair.  
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The elements imply a practical purpose or function, although “it has not yet attained the 
flawless, impersonal status of a manufactured object” (FRY, 72). It is, in a sense, a 
prototype. The third floor element is a box-like form, stucco and looks like a planter 
found in front of an office building. It appears solid and sound, with an inset top and 
opaque surfaces. “But, if we inspect this unit from different angles,” Fry continued, “we 
cannot fail to notice that it has no back” (FRY, 73). Spatially, each differs with their 
emphasis on openness and enclosure of volumes.  
There are two wall units hanging directly above the ‘chair’ and ‘industrial plant.’ A 
connection between industrial design and art is proffered. “One of the units,” Fry 
described, “a vacuum-formed grey plastic panel, features a sprocket-shaped relief centred 
on a smooth rectangular surface” (FRY, 73). Manufactured, it is of a practical order: the 
door to a wall safe or crank gear. The second unit is a collage and is made from 
construction paper and mounted on a mat board. Also built upon a grid pattern, the 
‘painting’ is a bevy of light blue, purple, red and black. It is geometric abstraction of a 
decorative design. The viewer is left to ponder the possible relationships between these 
different types of objects. The piece does not “develop any definite thesis” but one must 
consider the structure and function of objects. “As they function within related but 
distinct systems of production, distribution and use, they seem to be vehicles of different 
purposes, of different subjective values” (FRY, 73). They are all to a certain extent 
plants.  
Unlike some of the earlier semiotic work where the viewer linked objects to their 
references and back to the title, there is now an “operational reciprocity” at stake. “Each 
unit refers to objects, but as they are articulated as signs themselves, and can even be 
distinguished as different types of signs, they point to the nature of signification as well” 
(IOR, 21). A work like Industrial/mine/Theirs exploits both ideational and material sides 
of signification. As an example of this, Monk relates the plastic refinery to its actual 
counterpart, all the while it is simultaneously a model, “a sign of sorts, an iconic 
representation.” Furthermore, “A sign also may represent one thing while its material 
indicates another process. For instance, the vacu-formed plastic sheet on the wall behind 
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the model refinery is made of the same material as the model, both being products of the 
same petroleum technology” (IOR, 21-22: my emphasis).  
In the wall piece at the right, the gear is an index registering the imprint of what it 
represents, reified as a sign. There is a confluence of the eras of industrial and mass 
production; additionally the ‘chair’ and abstract ‘painting’ refer to the domain of art. This 
leaves the third object: apparently devoid of a corresponding wall unit. Yet in mimicking 
the Carmen Lamanna gallery’s idiosyncratic aesthetic—its distinctive floor and stucco 
walls—Monk sees the gallery itself as the “very condition of signification that creates the 
possibilities of these readings” (IOR, 22). Even though Monk admitted that he was 
writing about the work in a rigid manner that focused on its syntactic construction, the 
writing never closed down the work: on the contrary, through the analysis Collyer’s work 
revealed itself to be engaged in complicated thought-experiments on display, 
transmission and use.  
Something old, something new, something scary and Buy Me are the other two sculptures 
from 1981 that mobilize both wall and floor (see images 11-13). The former is composed 
of two floor units and a photographic wall piece. The photograph is a collage of televised 
images, although printed slightly skewed to the right. A single row of books have 
hollowed backs: “made of painted vacuum formed plastic and finished with a dusty 
looking surface, it initiates an open, complex series of references” (FRY, 76). The second 
floor element is composed of three different materials: paper maché, cardboard and wire 
mesh. It resembles a mechanical unit with functionality, although no details as to how it 
would do so. “This unit,” Fry confirmed, “is a large scale version of the ‘motor’ element 
of the plastic model in Industrial/mine/Theirs” (FRY, 76). The representation can be 
either ‘Something New’ or “Something Scary,’ depending upon “our affirmative attitudes 
and on the moral context in which we evaluate it” (FRY, 77). 
The wall piece is a large-scale black and white composition of twelve pictures in an 
irregular grid.  Each is taken from a television monitor or “cathode tube monitor” and its 
motif of communication is brought to the fore by its two central images: a large 
loudspeaker and a close up of an open mouth caught in the moment of saying something.  
Appearing again at the top left of the collage is the ‘motor’ of Industrial/mine/Theirs, 
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which begins to come across as a mocking gesture of the interior engine ‘driving’ the 
work. Additionally, there are closeups of military industrial images: a hand holding a 
rocket, a jet and the ‘sputnik.’  “To one side of the mouth a body falls on the hood of a 
car, and on the other side, a body falls through the air in front of a building” (FRY, 78). If 
communication is one aspect of this work, so is surveillance or watching. Yet, for Fry the 
images came across as too loose, or as a lack of control. The result is that this processing 
of information is overwhelming: for Fry, this is the ‘Something Scary’ indicated in the 
title.  
Buy Me continues the television and communication motif and again bridges the wall and 
floor.47  Two ‘televisions’ are placed next to one another on a table, one made from wood 
and yellow crezon (craft paper on plywood) and the other metal—a closer look reveals it 
as a modified Chico Air Cooler. Both are connected to electrical outlets. The table itself 
is industrial and stark with decoration at a minimum. Hanging on the wall behind these 
‘televisions’ is a photograph that has been cut into five narrow vertical strips. These strips 
hang separated by gaps of four-inch spaces. Printed on blue stock the images are dense 
scenes of crowds conveying “a sense of collectivity, the massing together of ‘ordinary’ 
people,” that evoke such public contexts as “photomurals frequently found in waiting 
rooms, apartment lobbies and restaurants, as well as in trade, professional and 
government information displays” (FRY, 79-80).  
The ‘televisions’ themselves are full of peculiar details. The front of the wooden box at 
the left is open. Inside are found a line of cut aspenite panels placed one behind another 
producing the effect “of a tunnel which narrows and constricts as it recedes.” Fry 
described it this way, and I will quote at length: “The final panel has no aperture and 
blocks vision. In the gaps between the panels, a series of electric lights have been 
installed, and sequenced with a stepping relay to illuminate one after the other from front 
to back. The second last light has a shorter duration than the others. Complementing the 
recession of the tunnel, the movement of the lights attracts and draws us with it towards 
the interior of the box. There, with the increased speed of the second last light, it dashes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 This is the last work listed in the 1982 Agnes Etherington survey.  
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us against the last, solid panel. Then it begins over again, enthralling, hypnotizing, 
sucking us in” (FRY, 80). 
The second ‘television’ mimics the style of a portable television set including handles, 
control buttons and gold trim. Unlike the brightness of the wooden box, the exterior of 
this one has been repainted with “grey wrinkle paint.” A honeycomb grid is placed at the 
front and shaped like the frame of a television tube. Behind this grid is the air cooler’s fan 
“and, behind it, the cathode tube, glowing with the characteristic blue-grey light of 
television. The screen shows no image” (FRY, 80). The fan is connected to a timer and 
starts and stops in fits; air is blown outwards and the light flickers.  
Acknowledging that they are bound to the language of the system they criticize, the 
sculptures “limited themselves to systems of representation that act upon us,” and offered 
no solutions as to “proper” or effective ways of response (IOR, 23).  After these works, 
Collyer’s sculptures moved toward representations of architecture and the landscape itself 
to become a sign system. While “spatially extended” or discursive they cohered into more 
recognizable forms, all the while remaining obdurate if less dense than they are in these 
works.   
We stand as an ‘I’ to these three sculptures, this shifter both conventional and existential. 
“Subjectivity as a term is not something we necessarily should give value to,” Monk 
wrote: “What is truly subjective, however, is social; it is not a matter of personality, 
presence of expression. Subjectivity is a process enacted in the contradictions between 
the public and private” (SWI, 195). The subject is not assured a unity, but a construction 
continually reinforced, vacillating uneasily “between containment and catastrophe.”  
In splitting the space between a ‘here’ and a reference, the sculpture’s presence is 
undermined, as is the viewer’s own.48 Yet, as Monk claimed, this splitting “produces a 
spatializing and temporalizing that could only be considered as sculptural” (SWI, 128: 
my emphasis). Within the installation, the body of the viewer—each with his or her own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 This particular claim by Monk was initially made in writing about the work of Ian Carr-Harris. However, 
it has currency with Collyer and I have transferred the specificity of the comments to wider claims about 
sculpture that utilize text and image.   
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history—is tied to the work or a situation for a duration.49 “Our presence there is not to be 
secure as minimalist temporalization made it out to be,” Monk added.  As the reference is 
split, it simultaneously directs us away and returns us to the space in front of it. “This is 
both an event and a structure of identity; but an identity is split in this temporal 
movement” (SWI, 128). The crux of Monk’s claim is that when both presence and 
reference are divided—cut off or deferred—the splitting undermines the object’s 
presence as well as the viewer’s.  This double spatializing and temporalizing is sculptural. 
Such a suggestion affirms sculpture’s potentiality as a site to act upon—whereby the 
viewer becomes a possible referent and how we think and make our relations and orient 
ourselves to objects in space becomes an issue for reflection and action.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 A situation, Monk defines, “is nothing which can be located in the work itself: the work constructs 
possibilities but demands that viewers enact its different responses. A situation then embodies at once the 
description of an event (the content of the artwork), the event of the work’s showing, and the response of 
the viewer” (Monk 1988, 27).  
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Figures 12, 13 
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9.  POLITICAL ART AND POLITICAL CONTENT 
Throughout the eight sections so far, Collyer’s work has been taken as an explicit 
example of the consequences of the devolution of sculpture under language and 
photography. Text, image and object are used in various iterations to refer to structures or 
sign systems. As noted, in works such as Industrial/mine/Theirs, both presence and 
reference are divided and the double spatializing and temporalizing that results from the 
undermining of the object and viewer’s presence is a sculptural process.  
Content and representation have been attended to: discontent emerges when content 
comes apart in order to be itself. This coming apart is assisted by the disjunction and 
asynchronicity within Collyer’s work. Representation is a double call: a standing in and a 
standing for. “To call for something to take a place, for someone to represent positions 
and values, to call a halt to the infinite production of capitalist flows,” Monk wrote, “is to 
call for work at its word.” 
But is there a distinction between political art and political content? Philip Monk posed 
this question in “Reading and Representation in Political Art,” a review of Carole Condé 
and Karl Beveridge’s exhibition Maybe Wendy’s Right at the Carmen Lamanna Gallery 
in 1979.  While listed as a review, Monk’s text operated more as a working thesis about 
representation and content. ‘Political art’ was being recuperated as a stylistic category, 
“and at the present time we console ourselves with the knowledge that in many cases of 
political art what is style has not yet become a genre.” In accordance, "political content 
must be examined in light of the whole question of content” (RPA, 49-50). 
The exhibition Maybe Wendy’s Right can be seen as one of Condé and Beveridge’s early 
attempts—alongside …It’s Still Privileged Art (1976)—at an aesthetic engagement with 
political issues of class and representation. The artists had pursued separate ‘minimalist’ 
practices until 1975, when they began collaborating together (see figures 14, 15).  In 
1977 they returned to Ontario after having lived in New York City for most of the 
decade. Collyer and Beveridge exhibited at the same gallery—the Carmen Lamanna 
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Gallery—for the seventies, while Monk had been aware of Condé and Beveridge on 
account of their contributions to the journal The Fox (see figure 16).50 
 
    
 
Figure 14, 15 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 “The history of the class position of the artist, and how an artist changes or transcends classes, was 
definitely a big issue in the work we did with The Fox,” Beveridge reflected in 1982 (Fleming 1982, 10). 
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Figure 16 
Maybe Wendy’s Right was a photographic exhibition—“fifteen sequential photographs 
with short captions, illustrating a political drama in soap opera/cartoon format” (Guest 
1979, 277). The series depicted a small suburban family, with a mother worried about 
grocery bills and a father working at the steel plant. Their daughter, Wendy, has been 
studying Marxist-Leninism, “and what with the lay-offs at the plant and those rising 
prices, Dad and Mum both wonder, ‘Maybe Wendy’s Right’” (Guest 1979, 277). The 
actors in these photographs were the artists and their children; the scenes were explicitly 
staged and the form an evident montage (see figures 17-19). A scenario was imagined 
and text provided a ‘voice over’ narration.51  
In Monk’s analysis, each image of the photo sequence was a composition of signs, “a 
type of semiotics in reverse (like propaganda)” that did not have “the density of a sign 
system of representations in the ‘real’ world, of capitalism, for instance, which could be 
deconstructed for a release of energy.” Neither did it have the “force of rhetoric of what 
Brecht called the social gest,” an action in which the audience is allowed to understand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 During this time, Condé and Beveridge spent a lot of time analyzing advertising. One of the most studied 
was an ad for the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce that included singer Anne Murray. “That ad 
campaign,” Condé said in an interview from 1982, “was pivotal in terms of our view of dealing with the 
audience on the outside and the photograph on the inside. The way Anne Murray confronted the camera, 
while looking very natural, came up in Maybe Wendy’s Right, in which the daughter holds out a plate to the 
camera while looking right into the lens. She presents the cost of the food on the plate while the family is 
carrying on behind her” (Fleming 1982, 12).  
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something more specific about the circumstances on stage (RPA, 50).52 Condé and 
Beveridge failed to find the “appropriate gestures for our situation” that “inscribe their 
making within them,” and by failing to relate their gesture to “public desire” the work 
was kept within the limits of representation (my emphasis). 
What does it mean for the work to be contained within the “limits of representation,” or 
that Condé and Beveridge failed to find the appropriate gesture for “our” situation? 
“Representation occurs,” Monk stated of these works, “when the subject (artist or 
spectator) cuts out a space of vision in each photograph where a unified action is depicted 
or meaning signified.” The status is that everything appears ‘correct’ or in order: “where 
everything has its place, where meaning is ordered, nothing emerges, nothing breaks.” 
Monk proposed that on a symbolic level the work functioned like a traditional 
representational painting contained within the ideal viewing space of the gallery. “With 
no ambiguity, with no breaks that signify contradictions, there are no connections with 
the ‘spectator’ except through control (of meaning) and identity (through perspectival 
constitution of the self)” (RPA, 50). 
 
Seen in this light, representation as representative becomes a matter of control, and the 
meaning of the work of art is suspended to its political effect. The work is taken 
instrumentally, for something, as a representation for something to come. “By remaining 
within representation, however, the effectiveness of the action is neutralized.” To 
infiltrate the code and “rupture the semiotic flow,” Monk concluded, was the way to 
escape the limits of control that hounded Maybe Wendy’s Right.53 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Monk quoted Roland Barthes definition of the social gest as “the critical demonstration of the gesture—
its inscription to whatever period it may belong—in a text of social mechanism of which is clearly visible” 
(RPA, 50). 
53 “Reading as representation does not lead to action; only multiple readings can.” If no breaks or 
disruption—no tension of meaning—provoked thought, how do we “act from content,” Monk wrote, “or 
even think about it?” (RPA, 50). 
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Figure 17 
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Figures 18, 19 
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Only after sorting through the review can we see the issue of political content and 
political art as far more complicated in his essay than he makes it out to be. Condé and 
Beveridge’s Maybe Wendy’s Right certainly can be seen as relying on political ‘content,’ 
the narrative of a family’s concerns in relation to economy and an impending labor strike. 
However, the lack of disjunction and asyncronicity leaves the content straightforward: a 
message simply to be delivered. It didn’t quite adopt the form of mass communication 
and neither did it take up a critical analysis or montage to a degree where a direct cause 
and effect relationship could be questioned. It lacked political content. Is it fair to say that 
it also failed as a political artwork?  
On a theoretical level and taking Monk’s terminology an argument can be made. The 
message was political while the form refused. If the relation to the audience is part of the 
conditions of representation—the artwork standing between production and reception—
then Condé and Beveridge failed to implicate their own authority into the work. Maybe 
Wendy’s Right was a work that received plenty of criticism. “The imaginative proved 
problematic,” Beveridge reflected in an interview from 1983.54 The straightforward (sans 
irony) narrative came across to some as watered-down rhetoric, a “moral dirge.” “Who is 
the show aimed at?” Tim Guest asked in Centerfold magazine. “It’s not trade unionists 
after all. Carmen Lamanna’s is not what you would call a worker’s little hive” (Guest 
1979, 277).  
But on a pragmatic level, it is less convincing to claim that Condé and Beveridge failed to 
produce a political artwork. The work was direct in its instigation of some form of action 
(however misplaced it appeared to some).  By producing the work in a multi-image 
sequence, the artists brought attention to how images could act within larger scenarios. 
Additionally, there are clues in the work as to the deliberate fusing and/or confusing of 
“the space of the page and the space of the stage,” that their practice soon undertakes. “In 
a bound volume,” Allan Sekula wrote, “every recto has its verso.”55 In following works 
like Work in Progress (1981-82) complex formal operations based on theatre tactics and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Quoted by Martha Fleming in “The Production of Meaning.” By the imaginative, Beveridge means the 
use of themselves as the central characters, whereas later they would use actors or actual members of the 
unions they worked with.  
55 Allan Sekula. “…The Red Guards Come and Go, Talking of Michelangelo,” in Carole Condé and Karl 
Beveridge: Class Works, 2008.  
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photomontage often functioned simultaneously with direct narratives. In Standing Up 
(1980-81), ‘spoken’ text accompanied the images and produced a complex temporal 
disorder, layering present time over the past events being described (see images 20-22). It 
also developed a localized practice of representation that Maybe Wendy’s Right failed to 
produce.   
If Monk had proposed that content is not a representation, intention or reading but rather 
a process produced in relation to a public—and that this relation is one of desire—then 
perhaps Maybe Wendy’s Right failed to make a connection with a public (either the 
‘masses’ or the contemporary art public) because this definition of a generalized ‘public’ 
in criticism and intention prevented it from becoming effective either politically or 
aesthetically. This can also be reflected in his comments when discussing the failure of 
Condé and Beveridge’s work to find the “appropriate gestures for our situation.” Even if 
Monk was standing for a position (which there can be no doubt he was doing), “our 
situation” is in fact multiple, and multiple situations  (depending on orientation) or 
readings present the possibility of action. 
In fact, Monk’s distinction between political art and political content appears to reside 
solely in the former’s reference to a stylistic category or fashion. To a certain extent, the 
stylistic category of ‘political art’ has become genre thirty years after Monk wrote his 
assessment, which isn’t to say that it need not be rethought. We could say with critic 
Grant Kester that “the process of creation allows the artist or intellectual to do something, 
to take some action, however nominal or symbolic” (my emphasis). Kester makes this 
argument in his book One and the Many, but for him this sort of artwork is often 
produced “while remaining protected from the compromises entailed by more direct 
political engagement” (Kester 2011, 48).  As a proponent of a dialogical model of artistic 
practice—a form or practice emerging at the time Monk wrote his review Reading and 
Representation and only theorized years later—Kester effectively argues against a form 
of artwork that regards the viewer as a subject acted upon, or that it is “precisely when 
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we come together (in collective forms of action and identity) that we are most at risk of 
succumbing to our instrumentalizing nature” (Kester 2011, 49).56  
In Kester’s renegotiation of aesthetic autonomy he seems willing to dismiss any aesthetic 
encounter “that claims to liberate or empower the reader precisely by subjecting him or 
her to a shattering ontic dislocation.” But such a statement itself is symptomatic of a need 
to reassess the ‘textual’ practice he critiques (Kester 2011, 48). I am more sympathetic to 
artwork that continually questions itself and its positioning without necessarily 
“pulverizing” the subject, as well as artwork that engages (primarily) in the gallery and 
the potential therein. ‘Political content’ (as articulated by Monk) remains a misnomer and 
point of contention for Kester. Yet if content is a process demanding its own fissure, then 
that process is a political one. Seen in this way, I would claim that discontent is political 
content. To be made available to the space for interpretation is to act upon the work.  
To reintroduce Hannah Arendt at this moment is to shift to a more substantial 
examination of the actor and spectator in the public realm, and the issues of acting and 
politics that I have been discussing can be given more substance. To then fold action back 
into thinking and withdrawal—a withdrawal from representation (into abstraction) and 
the public—will follow. In doing so, I will provide a more philosophical, political and 
poetic manner that is reflective of the untimely or ‘out of order.’  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 In an earlier book Conversation Pieces (2004), Kester included Condé and Beveridge in his argument for 
a more performative and process-based dialogical aesthetic beyond the boundaries of the art museum. 
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10.  ACTION AND THE SPACE OF APPEARANCE 
To act is often prompted by urgency: a suddenness and immediacy that calls for a 
response. It is the ability to introduce new or unexpected acts that interrupts normalizing 
social processes: an active disposition to our surroundings and more fundamentally our 
being.57 The tension between acting and thinking becomes explicit. For if the thinking 
subject should correspond to a politically acting subject, and if the thinking subject is 
untimely or out of order, what is the temporality of the politically acting subject? 
Moreover, what is the difference between an acting subject and a politically acting 
subject? Hannah Arendt provides a few clues to this, and her repeated use of a parable by 
Franz Kafka, alongside Oliver Marchart’s critique of this usage can lead us to examining 
the distinction between politics and the political and answer the question of the 
temporality of politics.  
Before we can tackle these questions, however, it is necessary to provide a brief 
background to Arendt in order to understand her thought more fully. She argued that 
politics is not a tabula rasa but a structured terrain, “enfolded in sedimented layers of 
traditions, which conversely, are ungrounded, flexible and changeable for their part” 
(Marchart 2007, 3). To act and judge in this absent ground has been a recurring motif in 
her writings, and as noted above, her philosophical engagements were informed by both 
explicit political concerns and a life long engagement with the thought of Martin 
Heidegger.  
In her construction of a phenomenology of action and the public realm (realized in The 
Human Condition), Arendt appropriated important themes of Being and Time (1927) and 
Heidegger’s ‘middle works,’ in particular the emphasis on finitude and contingency, 
disclosure and worldliness.  She conceptualized the public realm as a space of 
appearance, where animate beings are simultaneously subjects of perception and objects 
perceived; through an active and reciprocal relation (judging and being judged), beings in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Every acting self is fragmented and marked by a multiplicity of conflicting desires and needs. The actor 
never truly knows the who of disclosure. “Even for those who encounter the actor,” Trevor Tchir recently 
noted in his text Daimon Appearances and the Heideggerian Influences, “either as a co-actor or spectator, 
it is impossible to fully reify the appearance of the who ‘in the flux of action and speech’” (Tchir 2011, 55).  
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an appearing world come to exist: an aesthetic encounter and mutual provocation 
between actors and spectators. Through the incitement of an attentiveness to plurality, a 
density of appearances can emerge and with it a heightened sense of the real.  
To act, in its most elementary sense, is to take initiative: “to call something into being 
which did not exist before, which was not given…” (BPF 151).  Like thinking, acting is 
an open-ended process with no clear beginning or end destination. Whereas teleological 
accounts denied the openness of action, “demanding a prior positing of goals in order for 
the activity—now viewed as process—to have either meaning or value,” Arendt argued 
for action freed from instrumental reason and focused on the conditions necessary for the 
disclosure of action and meaning (Villa 1996, 47). Two principle conditions emerged: 
that of natality and plurality.  
Adapted from Heidegger’s Mitsein or being-with, plurality is the hallmark of not only a 
political community but our own authentic being. “To be isolated,” Arendt wrote, “is to 
be deprived of the capacity to act” (THC, 188). In her appropriation of Mitsein, Arendt 
also took the notion of co-being “in a radically un-Heideggerian direction” (Villa 1996, 
123). According to Heidegger, the public or anonymous ‘They’ are organized according 
to average interest and permission (Villa 1996, 123). No one is individuated in this 
realm, a sort of bureaucratic mass that is the “inauthentic” mode of everyday being. 
Publicly maintained interpretations control and distribute sense, and disclosure rests on 
the fact that other possible interpretations of meaning and being are concealed.  Caught 
up in the average and authoritative opinion of the They, Dasein “loses sight of its 
possibility of contributing to the disclosure of Being” (Tchir 2011, 62).58  
An “authentic” mode of being pulls Dasein from dispersal into the They in order to be its 
ownmost possibility. In this case, the ‘who’ of Heidegger is individuated by a withdrawal 
from the plurality that is the public sphere, resulting in what appears as a radically 
isolated being. In contrast, Arendt considers the ‘who’ to be individuated through action 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 “Dasein,” Villa explains, “is not something present-at-hand: it is not a ‘what,’ but a ‘who’ (Villa 1995, 
122). At a later point: “Considered from the perspective of the ‘who’ of Dasein, the world of Being-in-the-
world is a ‘with world’ (Mitwelt); ‘Being-in,’ according to Heidegger, is a ‘Being-with-others’. As beings-
in-the-world, we are originally amongst others like ourselves (hence the Husserlian ‘problem’ of 
intersubjectivity dissolves)” (Villa 1995, 122).  
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within an intersubjective plurality as our own authentic possibility.59  She favored the 
notion of natality or beginnings—the second principle condition for the disclosure of 
action and meaning—as a setting of something forth into the realm of appearances and 
spectatorship.  
To act is to begin amongst others something anew. It is not “forced upon us by 
necessity,” she wrote, “like labor, and it is not prompted by utility, like work” (THC, 
177). Yet how are we to justify this seeming lack of urgency with action as the political 
activity par excellence:  “a ‘mode of being’ rather than a capacity of the subject” (Villa 
1996, 118)?60  At this point we turn to the Kafka parable that is central to Arendt’s 
preface in her collection of essays Between Past and Future (1961).   
In this short parable by Kafka titled ‘He,’ the protagonist is on a path beleaguered by two 
antagonists—the past pressing the figure forward and the future driving him back. On 
account of this, the figure wishes to step outside the fight to the position of umpire over 
the clashing antagonists. Arendt has described the parable as a thought event, “where 
there are two or even three fights going on simultaneously: the fight between ‘his’ 
antagonists and the fight of the man in between with each of them” (BPF, 10).  Time, 
instead of a “flow of uninterrupted succession,” is broken where the figure stands. “Only 
because man is inserted into time and only to the extent that he stands his ground does the 
flow of indifferent time break up into tenses; it is this insertion—the beginning of a 
beginning, to put it in Augustinian terms—which splits up the time continuum into forces 
which then…begin fighting with each other and acting upon man in the way Kafka 
describes” (BPF, 11).  To step outside this struggle, however, as the protagonist wished 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 “Action and speech,” Arendt wrote in The Human Condition, “are so closely related because the 
primordial and specifically human act must at the same time contain the answer to the question asked of 
every newcomer: ‘Who are you?’” (THC, 178). Arendt placed stress on the disclosure of the who and not 
the what.  
60 If there has been an over emphasis in her writings on the disclosure of the who of the actor it is because 
“no form of political praxis could ever correspond to Arendt’s model of action,” (Wellmer 1997, 37). This 
was complicated by what she felt was our habitual reduction of freedom to will—a tension that remains 
within these pages as I discuss action and representation. 
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into this “suprasensuous realm” was according to Arendt the age-old dream of 
Metaphysics.61  
Even so, Arendt sympathized with the figure ‘He’ in Kafka’s parable.62 If thoughtlessness 
led to the sort of behavior Adolf Eichmann exhibited—this thoughtless evil Arendt 
termed “banal” in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem—what thinking is and the conditions 
of its emergence were seen in need of reconsideration. Perhaps the  “small non-time-
space in the very heart of time” she found in Kafka’s parable was an indication of a place 
to locate thinking. “Unlike the world and the culture into which we are born,” Arendt 
wrote, this interval or space “can only be indicated, but cannot be inherited and handed 
down from the past” (BPF, 13) Notre héritage n'est précédé d'aucun testament, she 
quoted French poet and writer René Char: “Our inheritance was left to us by no 
testament.” To discover and harness the possibility of this space—“to pave it anew”—
was a fact of “political relevance.”   
In his text Time for a New Beginning—which I briefly touched upon earlier—Oliver 
Marchart questioned the reading of Kafka given by Arendt. While he noted, “no other 
philosopher has ever made the beginning as beginning the center of his or her thought,” 
he also considered her reading surprisingly apolitical. This all the more surprising 
considering that she employs “exactly the same conceptual model in order to describe the 
very time-space in which acting as well as thinking occurs” (TNB, 142). As was noted, to 
act is to act now, and “to postpone acting to some future point means escaping from or 
avoiding the very temporal mode of politics altogether.” Kafka had written a “politico-
historical parable” Marchart proposed, and Arendt downplayed the political in Kafka’s 
parable, ignoring the political implications of this small “non-time-space in the very heart 
of time.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 “What has come to an end,” Arendt clarified, “is the basic distinction between the sensual and the 
supersensual, together with the notion…. that whatever is not given to the senses…is more real, more 
truthful, more meaningful that what appears, that it is not just beyond sense perception but above the world 
of the senses” (TMC, 162). 
62 Arendt referenced again Kafka’s parable in her section Thinking of The Life of the Mind, and expanded 
on the ‘time’ of this gap:  “What the thinking ego senses as ‘his’ dual antagonists are time itself, and the 
constant change it implies, the relentless motion that transforms all Being into Becoming, instead of letting 
it be, and thus incessantly destroys its being present” (LTM, 206).  
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Marchart provides evidence for his reading by using Arendt’s own discussion of 
revolutions, “the only political events which confront us directly and inevitably with the 
problem of beginning” (TNB, 142). Resulting not from calculation or fabrication but 
contingency, revolutions produce a gap within linear time: a hiatus between a no longer 
and a not yet.63 “Beginning is a form of (non)time not yet domesticated into space,” 
Marchart wrote. “And it is in this political sense that we have to understand the Arendtian 
description of the very temporality of the ‘beginning of a beginning’: the time of the 
political, the time of a new beginning, is precisely the nunc stans, the todayness or the 
present qui dure to which Arendt refers when she describes the gap between past and 
future.” To act and to think, then, emerge from this same space. 
However, a question remains: what is the difference between political action proper and 
action in general? “Action as such has an ontological status,” Agnes Heller wrote, 
“whereas political action is tied to the condition of freedom” (Heller 2001, 27). Action is 
ontologically rooted in natality and plurality, and this ontological foundation only comes 
to light after rest: in reflection, deliberation and debate. “Unlike the spaces which are the 
work of our hands,” Arendt wrote, “it [action] does not survive the actuality of the 
movement which brought it into being…” (Arendt 1958, 199). In this sense, action is 
performative and the articulation of an individual, a ‘who.’  It is a continual possibility 
and similar to thinking it must be persistent, “like the veil of Penelope: it undoes every 
morning what it had finished the night before” (TMC, 166). 64 
Yet, as Dana Villa reminds us, for Arendt “Genuine political speech concerns itself with 
‘the creation of the conditions that make [politics] possible or with the preservation of 
those conditions’” (Villa 1996, 37). As a theorist of the political, Arendt suggested that 
we must become more open to the political experience and she rarely discussed the 
content of the act itself: the “worldly reference of action.” This is on account of the fact 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Marchart clarifies: “the revolution is not itself the ‘new thing’, rather it is that which suspends—for a 
moment in time, or better: outside time—both the new and the old, seeking to expand the non-temporal 
hiatus” (TNB, 143). 
64 “The quest for meaning,“ Arendt wrote, “which relentlessly dissolves and examines anew all accepted 
doctrines and rules, can at every moment turn against itself, as it were, produce a reversal of the old values, 
and declare these as ‘new values’” (TMC, 177). 
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that these objects vary historically and culturally, are subject to debate and contestation 
and are generated in the course of their performance (Villa 1996, 41).65 
One last distinction will be helpful in clarifying Arendt’s complicated approach, and that 
is between politics and the political.  “On the one hand, politics—at the ontic level—
remains a specific discursive regime,” Oliver Marchart writes, “a particular social system, 
a certain form of action; while on the other hand—at the ontological level—the political 
assumes the role of something which is of an entirely different nature: the principle of 
autonomy of politics, or the moment of institution of society” (Marchart 2007, 7).  The 
former actualized in concrete politics—institutions and practices, while political action 
“always takes place in the midst of [these] automatic, habitualised or institutionalized 
processes.” As the acting figure inserts and in turn asserts itself through “acting against 
these processes, a world entirely devoid of the latter is simply not perceivable.” To act is 
a source of interruption, as Marchart writes, “of the sedimented layers of the social” 
(TNB, 146). And as the late Agnes Heller reminds us in Hannah Arendt on Tradition and 
New Beginnings, the essence of human action is the interruption of continuity: “But only 
continuity can be interrupted, for interruption cannot be interrupted” (Heller 2001, 20).  
I began this section by assessing action as the ability to interrupt normalizing social 
processes: an active disposition to our surroundings and more fundamentally our being. 
We have seen how the thinking subject and the acting subject emerge from the same in-
between space: the nunc stans. Temporally, each is out of order. The judicial 
connotations provide us with a way to regard the politically acting subject as urgently 
responding to particulars and the acting subject as mobilizing word and deed in a realm 
or space of appearance.  The distinction between politics and the political has clarified 
the complicated and often paradoxical approach Arendt undertook in her analysis of the 
vita activa.  
But a key question remains: is the thinking subject also a politically acting subject?  The 
following section takes up this question by returning to the notion of withdrawal, and in 
turning to withdrawal I also reintroduce the artistic practice of Robin Collyer now 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Close friend Mary McCarthy was mystified by the lack of content in action: “…speeches can’t be just 
speeches,” she noted. “They have to be speeches about something” (Hill 1979, 316: my emphasis). 
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inflected with the philosophical premises broached above. His 1985 sculpture The Zulu 
(European Version) can be seen as exemplary of a withdrawal from representation, and 
reflective of his larger practice of what it means to be a thinking and acting subject.  
 
11. WITHDRAWAL 
What ever withdraws, refuses arrival. But—withdrawing is not nothing. Withdrawal is an 
event.66  
“Making us pay attention is different from acting for us,” Philip Monk wrote in Idioms of 
Resistance. “In articulating representations, [Robin] Collyer does not speak for us—he 
offers us tools and analyses that are ready-at-hand for our taking.”67  Ready-to-hand or 
handiness refers to those entities (not only ‘tools’) that are determined by references and 
assignments that recede from view: that which withdraws.68  In this instance, Monk’s use 
of the Heideggerian term is as straightforward as a conclusion as it is ambiguous. In one 
way, it suggests that Collyer’s work is readily available for us if we are open to its 
thought experiment. Without the openness, the work withdraws. But where does it 
withdraw? It withdraws to its ‘proper’ place and the work appears in order. 
For Heidegger, our primary encounter with things comes with using them; they are 
implements taken for granted and counted upon, often working without entering our 
awareness. “Our association with useful things is subordinate to the manifold references 
of the ‘in-order-to,” he wrote (Heidegger 1962, 70). Always in action, its usability is 
manifest, yet “the peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-
to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically” 
(Heidegger 1962, 69).  What concerns me here is when the use is unstable and becomes 
“conspicuous,” whereby “this conspicuousness presents the ready-to-hand equipment as 
in a certain un-readiness-to-hand” (Heidegger 1962, 73: my emphasis). At this point it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Martin Heidegger, from What is Called Thinking? 9. 
67 Monk’s language here makes reference to the to famed analysis of “tools” Heidegger explored in Being 
and Time—particularly the terms “ready to hand” and “present at hand.” It is also the only explicit 
reference to Heidegger that Monk makes in the book-length essay Idioms of Resistance. Present at hand 
refers to those things that are objectively present.  
68 “Handiness” is translation of Heidegger’s term “ready to hand” provided by Joan Stambaugh.  
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becomes obtrusive (out of order) and not simply present for observation. Instead, what it 
was ready to hand with and for becomes an issue of thought.  
What to make of this simultaneous disclosure and redaction, especially in relation to the 
larger notion of withdrawal? “Appearance, as the appearance ‘of something,’” Heidegger 
proposed, “thus precisely does not mean that something shows itself; rather, it means that 
something makes itself known that does not show itself” (Heidegger, trans. Stambaugh 
1996, 29-30).  In a sense, withdrawal is the appearance of a disappearance, or more 
properly stated: an appearance as disappearance.  But we withdraw not to leave but for 
the sake of attending to: at once in and of the world, “I can flee being only into being” 
(LTM, 22-23).69 
Withdrawal can be seen in multiple ways—from something or further into (absorption). 
Of particular interest are not only this referential withdrawal but also when a subject 
undertakes under their own volition a withdrawal from the everyday order. Withdrawal 
can seem synonymous with a retreat; to re-treat or treat again implies the reemergence 
from this temporal interruption. Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacour-Labarthe see this 
reassessment as a re-treating of the question of the political.  If judgment is a by-product 
of thinking as Arendt proposed, then judgment manifest in speech and deed is action. In 
this light the thinking subject possibly becomes a politically acting subject.   
Yet as Arendt has noted, to think arises from the fact of withdrawal: “thinking always 
deals with absences and removes itself from what is present and close at hand”70 (LTM, 
199). Thinking gathers the absent tenses—the not yet and the no more—or, as Heidegger 
reflected in The Thinker as Poet (1947), “…Thinking holds to the coming of what has 
been, and is remembrance” (Heidegger 1993, 307).  It makes room for what is absent. 
The language of thinking is essentially metaphorical, and a condition of understanding.  
“Every thought,” Arendt proposed, “is strictly speaking an after-thought” (LTM, 78). 
This is in contrast to political action, whereas “only particular statements can be valid in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Arendt is referencing Merleau-Ponty, who she had started to read only late in her life.  
70 Since mental activities,” Arendt wrote, “non-appearing by definition, occur in a world of appearances 
and in a being that partakes of these appearances through its receptive sense organs as well as through its 
own ability and urge to appear with others, they cannot come into being except through a deliberate 
withdrawal from appearances” (LTM, 75). 
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the field of ethics of politics” (LTM, 200: my emphasis).71 This particularity is absent in 
thinking which is discursive; thinking is more succinctly connected with judging (an 
“enlarged mentality”) and both become manifest only through speech and deed (action).  
Irreducible to time as present, the spatial and temporal clearing of thought is a site of 
intensity. It is the event against which we show ourselves to be, where “the constancy of 
the self is always becoming undone in the moment of the critical reply” (Birmingham 
2002, 200).  
Thinking is out of order, and artworks as thought-objects are uniquely capable not only 
of bringing the temporal and spatial paradoxes to appearance, but of offering response 
and reply. Throughout this thesis I have taken as the site of study sculpture and its 
devolution under language and image. Robin Collyer should be seen as less of a case 
study (these concepts overlaid and applied to his thought) than as an artist whose work 
produces these thoughts; through revisiting his work and the analyses provided by both 
Monk and Fry these concepts come to light.   
We have already seen how Collyer’s work has participated in a devolution of sculpture, 
and the temporal and spatial consequences. His work has dealt with issues of content and 
discontent, as well as exhibited a refusal to provide ‘solutions.’ Yet the issue of 
withdrawal has not been written about in relation to his work.  As thought-objects, they 
have withdrawn from utility, if by utility we have in mind a particular end use for the 
artworks.  They are far more propositions, and the speculative is the thought-object. How 
is withdrawal manifest in his work though? To see how this is so we turn to one last 
sculpture from 1985: The Zulu (European Version). In this work there is both a sense of 
opting out and a withdrawal from representation.  
The Zulu is a large-scale sculpture evoking a cultural context and a way of life (see figure 
23). It is radically stripped down of media “panoply” and seems to offer no internal 
articulation like the works discussed above. Unlike earlier works that were multi-part 
ensembles, The Zulu (European Version) was a single, upright structure. “It is a vehicle 
which is not a vehicle,” critic Chantal Pondbriand described, “one whose cement wheels 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 As Heidegger wrote in Letter on Humanism, “Thinking does not become action only because some effect 
issues from it or because it is applied. Thinking acts insofar as it thinks” (Heidegger 1993, 217).  
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will not, in any case, advance” (Pontbriand 1987, 52). Resembling a closed off camper or 
trailer—some form of recreational vehicle—it is slightly smaller than anything ‘actual’ 
version; the full name refers to this slight stature (“European sized”) and there are no 
other versions of the work.  
 
 
 
Figure 23 
The Zulu is reflective of an earlier piece from 1973 called Likers, where two unadorned 
box-shaped units are placed in proximity, wide enough to suggest a mutual independence 
but “not so wide that their affinity as parts of a work is destroyed” (EDN, 42).  The 
materials are various—metals and cardboard—and there is a scrappiness to the 
construction. The smaller piece “squats lowly,” and the second with its cardboard top 
“seems to rise upwards.”  As Philip Fry described the work in “Event, Description, 
Narrative,” “The implicit activity of the boxes is heightened by their placement. Oriented 
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so that they do not line up with each other, they stand as two distinct presences in 
intimate but casual contact” (EDN, 42). Likers—similar to The Zulu—gave no “direct 
relation to the origin of the object” but suggested mimicry.  
And what should we make of the entry into Collyer’s catalogue from the Agnes 
Etherington exhibition? It provided not only a hint to his thought process at the time of 
his survey (see figures 24-26) but compared an image of Likers to a pair of parked 
vehicles placed in proximity. The Zulu (European Version) is a close cousin to Likers: it 
too reveals a closed boxed structure. “It is one of the few works,” Ted Retting wrote of 
the piece during its exhibition Idioms of Resistance at the AGO, “that is a completely 
closed structure and therefore an implied interior” (Retting 1993, 10). There are hints of 
wheels and a window but the window itself is dark and opaque, reflecting only that which 
is outward. It too is closed off, parked or withdrawn. But what is it withdrawing from?  
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Figures 24, 25 
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Figure 26 
 
Artist and critic Hito Steyerl recently wrote in her essay “The Spam of the Earth: 
Withdrawal from Representation” the desire of many to be invisible if for only fifteen 
minutes. “As we register at cash tills, ATMs, and other checkpoints—as our cell phones 
reveal our slightest movements and our snapshots are tagged with GPS coordinates—we 
end up not exactly amused to death but represented to pieces” (Steyerl 2012). Of the 
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generation trained to think the primary site of contestation for both politics and aesthetics 
was that of representation, she explained that as culture became a site of investigation for 
the “soft” politics in everyday life, the field of culture was supposed to fold back into the 
field of politics and “a more nuanced realm of representation” would lead to “more 
political and economic equality.”72 Yet it became clear that both “were less linked than 
originally anticipated, and that the partition of goods and rights and the partition of the 
senses were not necessarily running parallel to each other” (Steyerl 2012).  
While the tension Steyerl notes between cultural and political representation cannot be 
adequately developed here, she has written a compelling article emphasizing withdrawal 
in relation to what she terms image spam: “one of the many dark matters of the digital 
world,” she explains, where an inordinate amount of images float “around the globe, 
desperately vying for human attention.” In turn, there has been a break from the “contract 
of representation,” which had promised participation but “delivered gossip, surveillance, 
evidence, serial narcissism, as well as occasional uprisings.” Often overshadowed by this 
thrust of visual representation were the issues of political representation, and additionally 
overwhelmed by economic interests, political representation “slipped into a deep crisis.” 
In a loose correlation, Steyerl suggests economic speculation and deregulation have 
accompanied the destabilization of signs and referents, whereby image spam offers  “a 
reserve army of digitally enhanced creatures who resemble the minor demons and angels 
of mystic speculation, luring, pushing and blackmailing people into the profane rapture of 
consumption” (Steyerl 2012).  
“But what if image spam were actually much more than a tool of ideological and 
affective indoctrination?” Steyerl asks.  “What if actual people—the imperfect and 
nonhorny ones—were not excluded from spam advertisements because of their assumed 
deficiencies but had actually chosen to desert this kind of portrayal? What if image spam 
thus became a record of a widespread refusal, a withdrawal of people from 
representation?” This is a refusal to be monitored or taped, scanned, recorded and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 From his analysis of representation and politics, Monk can be seen as belonging to the early stages of this 
school.   
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identified, where in a “fully immersive media landscape” the notion of pictorial 
representation is construed as a threat.  
As a regression of the image is conveniently coupled with economic recession, The Zulu 
(European Version) can be seen as emblematic of this situation (thirty years removed). 
Consider Collyer’s primary sources for the naming the piece: “the corporate giving of a 
name of an entire culture to a vehicle such as Jeep Cherokee,” or armament names such 
as ‘Tomahawk’ and ‘Patriot.’ “It looks as cool as a mustard gas storage shed,” Jeanne 
Randolph noted (Randolph 1986, 41). In addition there is the more obscure 1930’s and 
1940’s use of the word ‘Zulu’ by transients (or ‘hobos’) for “a vehicle piled high with the 
belongings of American refugees of the Depression era.” “The ‘hobos’ were responding 
to a stranger,” Collyer wrote about the work in 1994, “a strange object.”  
 
 
Figure 27 
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Figures 28, 29 
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While The Zulu had been in Collyer’s plans for some time, it wasn’t until an invitation to 
participate in the large group exhibition in Montreal called Aurora Borealis that the 
project came to fruition.  Aurora Borealis took place in an underground mall with many 
vacant store spaces; the type of spaces given the artists can be seen by the images Collyer 
provided me that document The Zulu (Figures 27-29) during the exhibition. The space 
itself was important not only to the realization of the piece but the reading I bring to it. 
The Zulu has a suggestion of being parked, or in storage. The size of the room itself 
contributed to the dimensions and scale of the piece itself: the ‘windshield’ was a similar 
height to a side window in the space, and “the side window on the sculpture corresponded 
to a doorway in the space.”73 
In this underground mall, The Zulu found a fitting setting for the corporate appropriation 
of identity; where a “rich culture of people and history [was] reduced to a label for a 
product.”  “Speculation is not only a financial operation,” Steyerl writes, “but also a 
process that takes place in between a sign and its referent, a sudden miraculous 
enhancement, or spin, that snaps apart any remaining indexical relation” (Steyerl 2012). 
Just as there are many images without referents, there are many people without 
representation—even when every possible minority was acknowledged as a potential 
consumer.   
Collyer’s Zulu seems to bring these associations together indirectly, a closing up or 
“walking out” on visual representation, perhaps the result of uneven participation in 
political and economic realms. “Thus image spam becomes an involuntary record of a 
subtle strike,” Steyerl continues, “a walkout of the people from photographic and 
moving-image representation.” Consider the front ‘windshield’ of Collyer’s The Zulu: 
while referencing the proportion of elements in the space of its original incarnation, it is 
also the approximate size of a large screen. The screen is turned off with only our 
reflection across the dark pane.  Image spam is “a document of an almost imperceptible 
exodus,” Steyerl writes. It is a desire for resistance and reply against imposed 
representation. The Zulu in its compression (there is not point of entry or access for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Email conversation between Robin Collyer and the author.  
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‘windows’ are sealed) is a withdrawal from representation: it is an appearance as 
disappearance and ever more resoundingly a monument against inundation.  
 
12. CONCLUSION 
She could not keep pace with the inundation of water: “The wallpaper is still wet, and 
books are piled on the floor,” Mary McCarthy wrote. “There are two workmen on the 
balcony outside my window who keep passing back and forth through the apartment, 
leaving a wet trail (though we’ve put newspapers down)—it is raining again, hard. Well, 
I guess it is better than being robbed” (Brightman 1995, 364). 
This excerpt is from a correspondence between two friends of different pasts and 
temperaments. Mary McCarthy (1912-1989), iconoclastic author and critic, was writing 
to Hannah Arendt (1906-1975). After an early misunderstanding when they first met in a 
bar in 1944, McCarthy and Arendt became close. The result was an epistolary romance 
for 26 years lasting until Arendt’s death from a heart attack in 1975.  
“This morning,” McCarthy continued in her letter—“on the BBC, we hear that [President 
Gerald] Ford has pardoned Nixon. I.e., the cover-up continues.” While the newspapers 
were spread on the floor trying to prevent further water damage, the radio played on. A 
soft wall here, an inconsistent texture there.  “I have let myself go; quatschen ins 
Unreine, let your German teacher translate it,” Arendt replied to McCarthy.  “I somehow 
hope that the disaster or inundation has made you forget your dark thoughts.” And then:  
“Incidentally, I am not so sure that I’d rather be inundated than be robbed. About the 
latter one can hardly do anything—which is always a relief” (Brightman 1995, 365-66). 
For Arendt, reality is never neat; it has “has the disconcerting habit of confronting us with 
the unexpected, for which we were not prepared” (LTM, 61). In her melancholic quip to 
McCarthy, Hannah Arendt recognized the difficulty and need to act in such in inundated 
time. For Arendt, one had to resist paralysis and militate against thoughtlessness. “To 
expect truth to come from thinking,” Arendt once wrote, “signifies that we mistake the 
need to think with the urge to know” (LTM, 61). Misappropriating the calls from 
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technology activists to “free information,” it is worth asking what if information was 
instead freed from knowledge? From cognition and calculation?  As Arendt suggests, if 
thinking—with its quest for meaning—is antithetical to knowledge, then the activity of 
thought must be proffered.  
Robin Collyer’s practice is exemplary of such an approach to thinking through form; his 
works are thought-objects that affirm sculpture’s promise of spatiality.  This spatiality is a 
consideration and acknowledgement of relations, orientation and reference that are 
constitutive of being with others. In addition, the untimely offers an appealing model for 
the production and reception of art: that at times thinking and politics have no 
instrumental end—that they are simply practiced to confirm that they are still practicable. 
But this should not be seen as a retreat from some form of action, for as we have seen to 
act and to think emerge from the same space.  The task is to become available to that 
space, allowing and becoming aware of its emergence.  
The production of art is often an open-ended process with no clear beginning or end 
destination.  It is to take a simple initiative: “to call something into being which did not 
exist before, which was not given…” (BPF, 151). Often this is a response and reply to a 
particular situation: there is a need to speak directly without ambiguity, and the activist 
work of Carole Condé and Karl Beveridge can be seen to do so. It is kept succinctly 
within the limits of representation. While Philip Monk’s criticisms of their work is 
valid—especially of the fact that there is only one reading or one interpretation to the 
work—part of the argument relies on the notion of a generalized public. Each, of course, 
must be open to the fact that the public is plural and the idea of publics has to be 
considered. Although they fail to “inscribe their making within” the works, the 
appropriate gesture for the situation seems to demand clarity and not ambiguity.  
Thinking and artistic works should not simply be about the valorization of ambiguity, 
which is why there is a need to reconsider the two seemingly diametrical opposites—
withdrawal and action/content and discontent. Each require the other, for one cannot 
perpetually act in public.  Respite and retreat are required, all the more so to reassess and 
treat again.  We cannot satisfactorily say anymore that everything is political; in fact, the 
political is hidden in its obviousness. It becomes unapparent. “The political retreats 
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before our very eyes,” Marchart explains, “and we are blinded by the fact that we cannot 
not see it—which is precisely what constitutes it retreat” (Marchart 2007, 64).  
This paradox brings to the fore the need to rethink both action and withdrawal. Through 
artwork—these thought objects—these paradoxes can come to light. Difficulties and 
problems are not to be overcome (ie: solutions offered). Instead the questioning itself 
should be considered and this questioning as providing a place for meaning. “The need to 
think can be satisfied only through thinking,” Arendt explained, “and the thoughts which 
I had yesterday will satisfy this need today only to the extent that I can think them anew” 
(TMC, 163).   
As a negative freedom from immediate demands, thinking develops a sense of time in 
discontinuity (see figure 30). When continuity is the ‘achilles heel’ of the Toronto arts 
community, such an examination of the historical moment I have proposed can contribute 
to a reconsideration of content and discontent, especially in light of the ‘apolitical’ scene 
which emerged after this period in the early 1980s. This examination is not only a place 
to locate my own practice (Toronto, sculpture) but provides the thinking through of both 
art and the political: it a site of resistance to the tides of prescription.   
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Figure 30 
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PART TWO 
 
 
PREFACE 
 
 
If Part One of this dissertation looked into the notion of “out of order” as a model of 
artistic production and reception in the work of Robin Collyer (alongside important 
writings by Philip Monk and Hannah Arendt), Part Two is an example of how the 
terminology, ideas and premise are reflected in my own practice. The material and 
written works should not be seen as removed from one another: taking up the devolution 
of sculpture as articulated above, my practice can be seen following a triadic structure of 
text, image and object. This isn’t to say that the writing is a part of sculpture, but that it is 
a constitutive feature of my practice as a whole: text, image and object act as the 
substrate of my practice.  
What follows is a selection of artwork and writing produced over the four years of my 
PhD studies. Included is documentation of two curated exhibitions, an installation of my 
own work from 2010/11 (an exhibition I consider a turning point), writing for both 
publications and gallery exhibitions, and select images of my studio practice. At points I 
will focus in on particular works or projects to provide more detail on my thinking and 
material processes. Detailed information for each figure is provided under or next to the 
image.  
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13. THE FOX 
 
THE FOX was held at the G Gallery in Toronto from July 14 - August 20, 2011. Below is 
the text that I wrote for the exhibition and following are a series of images: 
 
 
THE FOX brings together the work of four artists—Oskar Hüber (Germany), Yam 
Lau (Canada), Sophie Nys (Belgium) and Kevin Rodgers (Canada)—under the 
simple proposition: that thinking is out of order. 
It is only when thinking interrupts our ordinary activities—and is in 
turn, interrupted by them—that we can say thinking is out of order. In 
1961 political theorist Hannah Arendt published Between Past and Future, and in 
the preface she drew attention to the temporal “intervals” within our daily 
continuity determined by “things that are no longer, and by things that are not yet.” 
This opening or “gap” between past and future is full of potentiality; for Arendt, it 
was a metaphor for the activity of thought itself. 
Through engagements with language and its subtraction, parables and sculpture, 
Hüber, Lau, Nys and Rodgers directly explore this notion of the interval. 
Additionally, the exhibition indirectly examines the relationship between two 
controversial figures of twentieth century thought: Hannah Arendt and her former 
teacher and lover Martin Heidegger. “Nobody knows the nature of traps better than 
one who sits in a trap his whole life long,” Arendt once said of the philosopher. He, 
in turn, never wrote a public word on her. 
In this exhibition, the artists do not describe nor attempt to explain 
this ‘intellectually toxic relationship’. Instead, their works set up a relation between 
a philosopher of withdrawal and a theorist of the public. Questioning the mutual 
opposition of retreat and engagement—or of formal content and discontent—the 
artist’s works operate in the interrupted space between. They speak two languages 
simultaneously: the language of the hermetic and that of the direct. 
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THE FOX: installation images. The top image includes from left to right works by myself (skewed 
poster), Oskar Huber (box with video projection), Yam Lau (architectural paintings) and Sophie Nys 
(video, vinyl record and artifact). The second image includes (from left to right) works by Yam Lau, 
myself and Sophie Nys. 
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The above two images provides more installation details, including a video and ‘artifact’ by  
Sophie Nys. 
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Detail of one of Sophie Nys’ pieces: a vinyl audio recording of Heidegger’s late lecture Art and Space 
(1969).  
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Detail image of the display for Oskar Huber’s video. 
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Detail image of Yam Lau’s painting. 
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14. NEVERTHELESS 
 
NEVERTHELESS (2011) was a piece that appeared in the exhibition THE FOX and was 
central to its presentation.  This is on account of the contextual information it provided 
and the reflective tone it set. Unfolded, it hangs on the wall askew, the result of the text 
being printed at a slight angle and the poster hanging with the text (and not the paper) 
level. NEVERTHELESS is one of the first pieces to bring Arendt explicitly into my 
material practice in any significant way.  
Three specific elements are found in NEVERTHELESS: a short parable written by 
Hannah Arendt on Martin Heidegger from 1953, a definition of the word “obscurity” 
derived from a publication called Errors in Composition, and three footnotes that circle 
back in on themselves. The first footnote provides the source for the Arendt parable, 
while the second is a text adapted from phrases found in the political art journal The Fox 
responding to the definition of obscurity: “And in this testament was perhaps enshrined 
the whole question as to the ethical influence of language upon expression.” The last 
footnote turns these thoughts to the matter at hand: “Eventually of course, I must return 
this conversation to art.”  
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NEVERTHELESS, 2011. Edition of Three. Ink on paper, approximately 20” x 30”. 
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NEVERTHELESS, detail. 
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15. UNTITLED (ERROR) 
 
Made during the installation of Sixteen New Works (see below) at Galerie Tatjana Pieters 
in December 2010, Untitled (ERROR) is a piece that inaugurated an interest in editing, 
error and revision that continues in my current work.  This frame originally held a black 
and white charcoal drawing that was removed and used as part of the process for this 
piece (the white page askance is an index of that original work). The text plays with the 
spatial quality of language, as well as mimics the layering, stacking and shifting process 
of some of the sculptural works (this work for instance reflects the structure of the 
sculpture Editor’s Note that sat in front of it—as can be seen from the installation images 
that follow in Section 16).  
 
 
Untitled (ERROR), 2010. Paint, pencil and ink on paper. Approximately 18” x 24”. 
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16. SIXTEEN NEW WORKS 
 
16 New Works was a solo exhibition held at Galerie Tatjana Pieters from December 18, 
2010 to January 30, 2011 in Gent, Belgium. It consisted of 8 newly composed pieces that 
ranged from drawing to text based work and sculpture, and was the result of re-working 
16 pieces that had previously been installed in the gallery in 2008 (and were in gallery 
storage up to the time).  Most of the new work was created the week before the opening 
on Dec. 18.   
Some of the older pieces were taken out of their frames, reversed and used as part of the 
process (Untitled: ERROR), while other drawings were stacked to function as a base for a 
new sculpture (Requested Delivery). The idea of editing became a key concern, and while 
the exhibition utilized manuscript pages from Hannah Arendt’s book Between Past and 
Future the introduction of her into my work more fully was yet to come. Two particular 
manuscript pages showed Arendt editing the typographic pages of her book and were 
modified and presented as REVISE, CORRECT, AND… (Parts I and III). The exhibition 
also included the first incarnation of the definition of obscurity that was again used as 
part of the piece NEVERTHELESS (2011). In this instance, however, it was installed on 
the wall in vinyl.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See information for images on the next page. 
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Information for the above images: Sixteen New Works (2010). Top left: Works include from left to right 
Untitled: OBSCURITY (2010) and Untitled: Wrap Up (2010). Untitled: OBSCURITY is vinyl on the wall, 
approximately 40 x 60 inches.  Above: Works include from left to right, Requested Delivery (2010); 
Quality Control (2010), Untitled: ERROR (2010), Editor’s Note (2010). Left: Works include from left to 
right, Foreign Affair (2010); Revise, Correct and… (Parts I and III), both from 2010. The materials of 
these pieces are ink, pencil, paint and paper. Framed, the dimensions are approximately 12” x 14”. 
 
Editor’s Note, 2010. Materials include various wood and paint. Approximately 22” x 23” x 18”. 
	   97	  
17. READ MORE 
The text READ MORE was written for an exhibition called Free Information at the G 
Gallery from June 2 to July 2, 2011.  Installed by artists Kristoff Steinruck and Dawn 
Johnston, Free Information was an attempt to come to grips with the sheer amount of 
information “that seeps into our mental space like water in a basement.” The text I wrote 
was retyped by Nestor Kruger and printed large on a sheet of plywood and installed in the 
courtyard of the gallery.  Legal size Xeroxed copies were also available in the gallery.  
Following the images is the text of READ MORE.  
 
 
 
 
Above: installation image of Steinruck and 
Johnston’s Free Information (2011). 
 
Right: image of print out for essay. 
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READ MORE She	   could	  not	   keep	  pace	  with	   the	   inundation	  of	   water:	   “The	   wallpaper	   is	   still	   wet,	   and	  books	  are	  piled	  on	   the	   floor,”	  Mary	  McCarthy	  wrote.	   “There	   are	   two	   workmen	   on	   the	  balcony	  outside	  my	  window	  who	  keep	  passing	  back	  and	  forth	  through	  the	  apartment,	  leaving	  a	   wet	   trail	   (though	   we’ve	   put	   newspapers	  down)—it	  is	  raining	  again,	  hard.	  Well,	  I	  guess	  it	  is	  better	  than	  being	  robbed.”i	  	  This	   excerpt	   is	   from	   a	   correspondence	  between	   two	   friends	   of	   different	   pasts	   and	  temperaments.	   Mary	   McCarthy	   (1912-­‐1989),	  iconoclastic	   author	   and	   critic	   was	   writing	   to	  emigree	   political	   philosopher	  Hannah	  Arendt	  (1906-­‐1975).	  After	  an	  early	  misunderstanding	  when	   they	   first	   met	   in	   a	   bar	   in	   1944,	  McCarthy	  and	  Arendt	  became	  close.	  The	  result	  was	   an	   epistolary	   romance	   for	   26	   years	  lasting	   until	   Arendt’s	   death	   from	   a	   heart	  attack	  in	  1975.	  	  “This	   morning,”	   McCarthy	   continued	   in	   her	  letter—“on	   the	   BBC,	  we	   hear	   that	   [President	  Gerald]	   Ford	   has	   pardoned	   Nixon.	   I.e.,	   the	  cover-­‐up	   continues.”	   While	   the	   newspapers	  were	   spread	   on	   the	   floor	   trying	   to	   prevent	  further	  water	  damage,	   the	  radio	  played	  on.	  A	  soft	   wall	   here,	   an	   inconsistent	   texture	   there.	  	  “I	   have	   let	  myself	   go;	  quastschen	   ins	   Unreine,	  let	   your	  German	   teacher	   translate	   it,”	   Arendt	  replied	   to	   McCarthy.	   	   “I	   somehow	   hope	   that	  the	   disaster	   or	   inundation	   has	   made	   you	  forget	   your	   dark	   thoughts.”	   And	   then:	  	  “Incidentally,	   I	   am	  not	   so	   sure	   that	   I’d	   rather	  be	  inundated	  than	  be	  robbed.	  About	  the	  latter	  one	  can	  hardly	  do	  anything—which	  is	  always	  a	  relief.”	  	  For	   Arendt,	   reality	   is	   never	   neat;	   it	   has	   “has	  the	  disconcerting	  habit	  of	  confronting	  us	  with	  the	   unexpected,	   for	   which	   we	   were	   not	  prepared.”ii	   	   It	  was	   only	   recently	   that	   Arendt	  had	  herself	  been	  the	  victim	  of	  a	  robbery,	  and	  she	   knew	   the	   perverse	   results	   of	   an	  inundation	   of	   a	   different	   kind.	   In	   1971	   she	  published	   her	   essay	   Lying	   in	   Politics,	   a	  response	   to	   the	   publication	   of	   The	   Pentagon	  
Papers.	  Military	  analyst	  and	  bureaucrat	  Daniel	  Ellsberg	   smuggled	   out	   the	   4000	   page-­‐plus	  documents	  precipitating	  a	  constitutional	  crisis	  and	   substantially	   eroding	   public	   support	   for	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  Arendt	  noted	  at	  the	  time	  the	  
philosophical	   and	   political	   ramifications	  therein.	   Instead	   of	   focusing	   on	   the	   debate	  between	  secrecy	  and	  transparency—a	  debate	  that	   today	   would	   include	   the	   spate	   of	  Wikileaks	   disclosures	   and	   the	   accompanying	  platitudes	   of	   transparency	   found	   within	   our	  culture	   of	   exposure—it	  was	   the	   lie	   as	   a	   form	  of	  action	  that	  Arendt	  focused	  in	  on.	  	  As	   a	   philosophical	   conundrum	   there	   is	   a	  fundamental	   parallel	   between	   lying	   and	  action,	   for	   the	   political	   liar	   wishes	   to	   alter	  what	  exists.	  It	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  action	  and	  assertion	  of	   new	   beginnings	   and	   events:	   contingent	  futures.  Arendt	   argued	   that	   while	   the	  deliberate	   falsehood	   is	   one	   that	   deals	   with	  contingent	   facts	   the	   professional	   problem	  solvers	   within	   the	   Pentagon	   hardly	   had	   the	  “patience	   to	   wait	   until	   theories	   and	  hypothetical	   explanations	   are	   verified	   or	  denied	  by	  facts.”iii	   	  Their	  tactic	  was	  instead	  to	  fit	   their	   reality	   into	   theory,	   and	   in	   doing	   so	  they	   would	   mentally	   rid	   themselves	   of	   its	  contingency.	  	  More	  than	  the	  simple	  dilution	  of	  factual	   history	  with	   deception,	   the	   danger	   of	  this	  form	  of	  lie	  is	  in	  its	  wholesale	  replacement	  of	  reality	  and	  true	  political	  beginnings.	  And	  as	  Arendt	   repeatedly	   stressed,	   to	   act	   is	   to	  begin	  with	  uncertainty	  anew.	  	  Yet	   in	   her	   melancholic	   quip	   to	   McCarthy,	  Hannah	   Arendt	   also	   recognized	   the	   sheer	  difficulty	  of	   acting	   in	   such	   in	   inundated	   time.	  In	   needing	   to	   respond	   to	   that	   which	   we	  differently	  and	  surely	  find	  ourselves	  in;	  a	  time	  when	   information	   ‘seeps	   into	   our	   mental	  space	  like	  water	  into	  a	  basement.’	  For	  Arendt,	  one	   had	   to	   resist	   paralysis	   and	   militate	  against	   thoughtlessness.	   	   Here	   the	   marginal	  concept	   of	   friendship—the	   space	   between	  two	   people—can	   play	   an	   organizing	   role.	  Arendt	   placed	   a	   high	   regard	   on	   friendship	  throughout	  her	  life.	  It	  signifies	  equal—but	  not	  necessarily	   like-­‐minded—partners	   in	   a	  common	  community	  where	  ideas	  are	  debated	  and	   assertions	   defamiliarized.	   The	   space	   is	  not	  one’s	  own.	  It	   is	  neither	  strictly	  public	  nor	  private	  but	  a	  unique	  discursive	  sphere	  at	  once	  plentiful	   and	   scarce.	   With	   its	   examples	   and	  insights	   into	   the	  nature	  of	  politics,	   friendship	  is	  not	  only	  a	  metaphor	  for	  public	  activities	  but	  offers	   a	   site	   of	   resistance	   to	   the	   tide	   of	  prescription.	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“To	   expect	   truth	   to	   come	   from	   thinking,”	  Arendt	  once	  wrote,	  “signifies	  that	  we	  mistake	  the	   need	   to	   think	   with	   the	   urge	   to	   know.”iv	  Misappropriating	  the	  call	  to	  ‘free	  information’,	  it	   is	   worth	   asking	   what	   if	   information	   was	  instead	   freed	   from	   knowledge?	   From	  cognition	   and	   calculation?	   Furthermore,	   if	  thinking—with	   its	   quest	   for	   meaning—is	  antithetical	   to	  knowledge,	   then	  the	  activity	  of	  thought	   must	   be	   proffered:	   familiar	   and	  unknown,	  together	  and	  bottomless.	  	  	  	  
1	  Brightman,	  Carol,	  Ed.	  Between	  Friends:	  The	  Correspondence	  of	  Hannah	  Arendt	  and	  Mary	  McCarthy,	  1949-­‐1975.	  New	  York:	  Harcourt	  Brace	  &	  Company,	  1995:	  364-­‐366.	  	  1	  Arendt,	  Hannah.	  Crises	  of	  the	  Republic.	  New	  York:	  Harcourt	  Brace	  &	  Company,	  1972:	  7.	  	  1	  Ibid	  12.	  	  1	   Arendt,	   Hannah.	   The	   Life	   of	   the	  Mind.	   New	  York:	  Harcourt	  Brace	  &	  Company,	  1978:	  61.	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18.  THIS YEAR, LAST YEAR, NEXT YEAR, NEVER 
During the Fall of 2010 I participated in a seven-week residency at The Banff Centre led 
by Jan Verwoert, The distance between our minds and thoughts equals the distance 
between our words and mouths.  The result was a small body of works whose 
considerations I continue to work with: surface, the conditions of production, and 
presentation structure. This Year, Last Near, Next Year, Never is the main piece from this 
body, a large shelving unit that displayed three elements: a torn page from a magazine, a 
vinyl label and a Vanity Fair magazine. The scale is the largest I have utilized, and an 
inversion of a series of closed, containers that I had been working with at the point.  
An example of the closed ‘containers’ is Anole (2010). The structure itself is built from 
its setting: the color palette of the studio I had, and the dimensions of the form according 
to fit various magazines and publications on hand. Surface treatment becomes important, 
and the idea of surfacing—of bringing something to appearance that was already there or 
“hidden in its obviousness”—is introduced as a strategy for making (one certainly 
informed by my reading of Hannah Arendt). Anole was the beginning of a proposed 
series of works to create structures according to material, tone and color of the sites they 
are to be situated.  
Unlike the openness of This Year… the structure of Anole is more modest, particular and 
uncertain. This approach can also be seen in the work The Wherewithal (2010), created in 
my studio in London upon returning from Banff. The pairing of the two here is done so to 
indicate two ways of manufacture: starting from the exterior conditions or generated from 
the items (magazines, periodicals) that dictate the size. In the case of The Wherewithal, 
the two journals are Newsweek and Foreign Affairs: the former is published weekly and 
the latter six times annually. Again, issues of time and circulation as well as surface and 
display are involved.  
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This Year, Last Year, Next Year, Never, 2010.  
Wood, paint, vinyl and paper. Approximately 6 x 8 feet. 
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This Year…, detail. 
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This Year…, detail. 
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Anole, 2010. Various wood and paint. Approximately 13” x 13” x 20”. 
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The Wherewithal, 2010. 
Wood, laminate, paint, printed matter and pencil.   
Approximately 14” x 12” x 19”. 
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19. IF DESTROYED, WE SHOULD HAVE TO RECREATE FROM 
PHYSICAL NEED 
 
If Destroyed, We Should Have To Recreate From Physical Need was an exhibition held at 
a small space in London called Parker Branch from Sept 11, 2010 to October 9, 2010. Six 
artists were involved, including Kim Adams, Robin Collyer, Claire Greenshaw, Joel 
Herman, Jen Hutton and Nestor Kruger. What follows is the brief text I wrote for the 
exhibition: 
 
Narrow and unassuming is 99 1/2 Stanley Street. For this space I had a direct 
curatorial premise: to present simultaneously 1) the subtraction and division of 
matter and 2) the accumulation of meaning. I asked six artists to participate. To each 
of their works I brought the question of how interruption and division could 
compliment their project. “Do you want to feel me” (sans question mark) one work 
asks; another presents the opposite: “I will destroy ALL”. The store front window 
reflects the street and trees and passersby. Two bicycles are locked up nearby. A 
ribbon ceremony has taken place. Words have a life, so has merchandise, so has 
work, and in each sensibility meanings assemble. 
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KIM ADAMS/ROBIN COLLYER/CLAIRE GREENSHAW/JOEL  HERMAN/JEN HUTTON/NESTOR KRUGER
IF DESTROYED, WE SHOULD HAVE TO RECREATE                    
FROM PHYSICAL NEED
ORGANIZED BY KEVIN RODGERS
PARKER BRANCH 99 1/2 STANLEY STREET LONDON ON
11 SEPT 2010 TO 9 OCTOBER 2010. OPENING SATURDAY 11 SEPT 
5 P M
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Installation images from If Destroyed…  
Clockwise from top left: Jen Hutton (ribbon), Nestor Kruger (bag), Robin Collyer (vinyl).             
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Installation images from If Destroyed…  
Left Image: Claire Greenshaw (drawing on wall), Joel Herman (cut paper), Nestor Kruger and Robin 
Collyer. Right Image: Kim Adams 
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20. MISSILE PARK 
Missile Park was a two-part project produced for the LOLA festival in London in 
September, 2010. It included a public sculpture in Victoria Park along with a poster 
project, and it is the latter that is illustrated in these pages. Bringing together poetry and 
revisionism (W. H. Auden), arms manufacture (General Dynamics) and appropriation in 
tension with one another, the poster from Missile Park was installed on various boards 
and telephone poles around downtown London. 
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Image of poster installed on street. 
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21. FIVE WORKS 
 
The five works listed here in order of appearance are Beyond Evolution (2009), Broken 
Liberal Promise # 49 (2012), Untitled (2007), Give my Regards to the Girls (2009) and I 
WILL NOT CONFUSE (2010). Untitled was produced during my MFA program and no 
longer exists in its original incarnation. A second version is currently being created and is 
expected to be in the exhibition OUT OF ORDER that accompanies this written 
dissertation. Each of these artworks utilize the constitutive features of text, image and 
object. Some take up all three while others focus in on just text, such as I WILL NOT 
CONFUSE that was created as an insert for Fuse magazine.  
A provisional quality can be found in the majority of the works, where political referents 
are numerous as are issues of circulation and economy.  A sense of retreat or 
reassessment is found in works like I WILL NOT CONFUSE or Beyond Evolution: self-
criticism surfaces in the former (repeat: “I will not confuse libertarian hallucinations with 
sound investment advice”), while in the latter units are stacked, awaiting use or 
movement. In another piece a campaign sign is appropriated into an angular relief 
(Broken Liberal Promise #49) and in another a hand written statement accompanies a 
farewell bid: Give my regards to the girls.  
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Beyond Evolution, 2009.  
Paint, plaster, brick, wood and printed matter. Approximately 24” x 25” x 32”.  
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Beyond Evolution, detail.  
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Untitled, 2007. Printed matter, paint, ink and wood. 
Approximately 14” x 24” x 60”. 
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Broken Liberal Promise #49, 2012.  
Coroplast, paint and wood. Approximately 12” x 2” x 22”.  
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Broken Liberal Promise #49, detail.  
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Give my Regards to the Girls, 2009. 
Ink, vinyl, paint and printed matter. Approximately 9” x 12”. 
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I WILL NOT CONFUSE, 2011. 
Ink on paper. 
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22. THREE REVIEWS 
The three reviews included here are a working though of ideas that would appear in my 
written dissertation and are presented by date of publication. “Project for a New 
American Century,” reviews work by Jennifer Marman and Daniel Borins and was 
published in Border Crossings, issue 111 (2009); “The Changing Picture” was a lengthy 
review of Carole Conde and Karl Beveridge’s survey exhibition and accompanying book 
and was the cover story for Fuse magazine, Volume 33, number 3 (2010); and “Bruce 
Naumam: Audio/Video Piece for London, Ontario” reviewed the exhibition curated by 
Christopher Regimbal, and appeared in C magazine, issue 110 (2011).  
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by Nauman in advance and materialized by 
gallery members based on his instructions. 
!ese instructions indicated that a cam-
era was to be placed in the upper corner of 
a sealed-o" room, with a line leading out 
to a monitor in an open room. !e tape 
recorder was to play the audio at a high 
enough volume to be heard through the 
partitions between the two rooms. 
Yet, in the review included in the dis-
play case, Rabinowitch writes that Nau-
man “put a TV camera on its side [and] 
focused it on one small corner of the room.” 
It is this approach, with the camera on 
its side on the !oor that Régimbal chose 
to follow. Did Rabinowitch misread the 
 initial installation and Régimbal go with 
this misleading documentation? Or, if Nau-
man did in fact end up deciding to lay the 
camera on the #oor, why in following iter-
ations—including the Venice version—did 
he revert back to the original instructions? 
And these are not the only questions that 
remain unanswered. 
If it was Régimbal’s intention to get as 
close to the original work, and some sem-
blance of its particular presence, then the 
closer he got, the farther away he ended up. 
Consider the audio: the recording of Nau-
man slapping his thighs is not the origi-
nal, but neither is it new. It is from a 1991 
installation of this piece. And also that 
the original exhibition was organized al-
most entirely by Curnoe—author of fan-
tastically nationalist manifestos, ardent 
Regionalist and by most accounts anti-
American—and the contradiction of in-
viting this thoroughly American artist to 
exhibit in London, which is  confounding. 
!e archives, according to Régimbal,  supply 
Curatorial Assistant at the Justina M. Barnicke Gallery, Chris-topher Régimbal recently “restaged” a disarming Bruce Nau-
man installation at the Forest City Gallery. !e piece is disarming 
in that you walk into an entirely empty space but for a chair and 
small television monitor sitting on the #oor. And you hear the 
mu&ed sound of slapping and shu&ing: the sound of hands on 
knees or thighs. Playing on the monitor is a live feed, presuma-
bly from a camera you cannot see. !e image is focused on an 
empty, interior corner of a constructed enclosure at the back end 
of the long gallery. But you do not have access to the interior of 
this space, and there is still no sign of the source of the repetitive 
sound. It is, one could say, a very slow piece. Yet, what Nauman 
has achieved with sparse means is the manifestation of conceal-
ment and dislocation: the simultaneous o"ering and denial of 
space. Initially called Surveillance Piece, it has over time become 
known in Nauman’s catalogue raisonné as Audio/Video Piece for 
London, Ontario (1969–70). 
!e impetus for this reprisal came a*er seeing the piece installed 
at the 2009 Venice Biennale as part of Bruce Nauman’s award- 
winning survey, Topological Gardens. Régimbal, a young cura tor 
with an interest in the emerging strategies being used to  reconsider 
historical exhibitions, was particularly attracted to the  Audio/ Video 
piece, which carried the name of this Southern Ontario city. Hav-
ing studied in London and been drawn to the artistic energies ex-
hibited through the city’s artist-run centres over the past 40 years, 
Régimbal appeared to have found the perfect project for  archival 
investigation. Yet, if restaging the work was to be more than just 
the capitalization of a fashionable moment—and there certainly 
is no lack of curators uncritically deploying this approach—what 
would returning the work to London reveal anew? 
Cognizant of this, Régimbal has provided some archival infor-
mation on the original exhibition of Nauman’s piece in London 
at the now-defunct 20/20 Gallery with a peculiar selection of 
ephemera. Placed in the small glass case opposite the front desk of 
the gallery are -ve items: two gallery signs 
(one rendered eloquently by Greg Curnoe), 
a piece of letterhead listing all the board 
members of the 20/20 Gallery co-opera-
tive, a copy of a 20¢ magazine containing 
a brief 328-word review of the original ex-
hibition written by sculptor David Rabi-
nowitch, and lastly, the press release that 
announced the closing of the 20/20 Gal-
lery in 1970. 
Located on the second #oor of 68 King 
Street in London, the 20/20 Gallery was a 
leading centre for contemporary art recog-
nized nationwide during the four years of 
its existence (1966–70). !e gallery opened 
with a retrospective of Michael Snow’s Walk-
ing Woman series (1961–67) and presented 
important solo exhibitions by Joyce Wie-
land, Greg Curnoe, Jack Chambers and 
Robert Fones, among others. As Régim-
bal notes in an accompanying essay, “it 
was the -rst gallery in Canada to pay art-
ist fees, the -rst alternative gallery to re-
ceive funding from the Canada Council 
for the Arts and is widely acknowledged 
as the forerunner of Canada’s parallel gal-
lery system.” Nauman’s Audio/Video Piece 
for London, Ontario was one of the last ex-
hibitions in the space, and is unique in that 
it was the only solo exhibition by an Amer-
ican artist in a space largely devoted to re-
gional interests. 
Due to Régimbal’s diligent research, we 
now know that it was in 1969 at the behest 
of Greg Curnoe that the initial exhibition 
came together. Curnoe had written a let-
ter to Nauman’s New York dealer, Leo Cas-
telli, and invited Nauman—then a young 
artist only a few years removed from his 
mfa—to show. A*er an exchange of post-
cards and letters, the piece was conceived 
 Bruce Nauman, Audio/Video Piece for London, 
 Ontario, 1969–70, installation view, Forest Gallery, 2011.
photo: julia beltrano; image © bruce nauman, 
 courtesy donald young / sodrac 2011
bruce nauman: audio/video piece 
for london, ontario
the forest city gallery, london, ontario
january 7 – february 19, 2011
by kevin rodgers
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